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TELL ME HOW IT ENDS:
THE PATH TO NATIONALIZING THE U.S. 
PHARMACEUTICAL INDUSTRY
By Fran Quigley*
ABSTRACT
The U.S. medicines system is broken. Millions of Americans suffer and some 
even die because they cannot afford medicines discovered by government-funded 
research. At the same time, corporations holding monopoly patent rights to those 
medicines collect some of the largest profits in modern capitalist history.
It does not have to be this way. The global legacy of treating essential medicines 
as a public good and the robust U.S. history of government seizure of private 
property for the public interest reveals a better path: the United States should 
nationalize its pharmaceutical industry.
U.S. statutory law already provides broad powers for the executive branch to 
immediately order the substantial manufacturing and distribution of patent-free 
medicines. That statutory authority should be immediately implemented and 
further expanded. In addition, U.S. constitutional law justifies a full seizure of 
all industry assets.
Given the pharmaceutical industry’s substantial reliance on government 
funding and licensing, along with the industry’s widespread malfeasance that 
harms the public welfare, the amount of compensation for this seizure will be 
limited. That seizure and compensation will finally conclude the tragic era of 
medicines profiteering and launch a new system that restores life-saving 
medications to their rightful role as affordable, accessible public goods.
* Clinical Professor and Director of Health and Human Rights Clinic, Indiana Uni-
versity McKinney School of Law, quigley2@iupui.edu. The author thanks Democracy Col-
laborative for its support of the research that led to this article. The author also thanks the 
following for their inspiration and guidance on a range of issues: Dana Brown on public 
pharmaceuticals, Thomas Hanna on the history of nationalization in the United States, pro-
fessors Brook Baker and Christopher Morten on intellectual property law and pharmaceuti-
cals, and professors R. George Wright and Florence Roisman on Fifth Amendment takings 
law. The author also thanks the Type 1 diabetes patient activists with T1International, who 
tirelessly advocate for the human right to healthcare. Finally, thank you to Health and Hu-
man Rights Clinic students Arriana Fitts and Reja Yousuf for research assistance.
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INTRODUCTION
When they started, it was still light. Several dozen individuals 
marched to a street corner just south of downtown Indianapolis, 
where others were waiting for them. People kept arriving, some 
carrying banners and signs, until the crowd spilled over the curb of 
the broad sidewalk and into the street. A microphone was turned 
on; some brief introductions were given. Then they began.
First, Janelle Lutgen spoke about her son Jesse. The only health 
insurance Jesse could find had a $10,000 deductible, so he tried to 
pay for his insulin out of pocket—and routinely came up short. He 
died on February 7, 2018. Mindi Patterson talked about her sister-
in-law, Meaghan, who also rationed the insulin she could not af-
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ford. Meaghan died of diabetic ketoacidosis on Christmas Eve in 
2018. Antroinette Worsham found her twenty-two-year-old daugh-
ter Antavia lying in bed, not breathing. She had an empty vial of 
insulin by her side. 
Dusk began to fall. Candles were passed out and lit. Family 
members kept coming forward, weeping, and carrying pictures of 
their loved ones. All of those eulogized were Americans with Type 
1 diabetes. Most were working, and some even had limited insur-
ance. But none of them could afford the insulin manufactured by 
corporations like Eli Lilly and Company, whose headquarters the 
crowd had gathered in front of. After each family took their turn, a 
local minister offered a prayer. “I stand in solidarity tonight with all 
of the families who lost loved ones, not to a disease they carry, but 
to a disease corporations carry. A disease called greed.” 
Then Nicole Smith-Holt walked to the middle of the intersec-
tion, stopping directly in front of impressive fountains and colorful 
signs with the Eli Lilly logo. Police cars surrounded her, and one 
officer using a loudspeaker ordered her to leave the street. She ig-
nored him and began reading the names of all the young Ameri-
cans who had died from rationing insulin in the past two years. 
Published accounts collected by the vigil organizer, 
T1International, include at least a dozen such deaths.1 That is like-
ly a significant undercount, as one in four Americans with Type 1 
diabetes admit to rationing their insulin at least once in the past 
year, each of them risking a fatal onset of diabetic ketoacidosis.2 
The police officer repeated his order. Smith-Holt spoke the 
names a second time, this time prefacing each with the phrase 
“Justice for . . . .” The crowd repeated the phrase and the names 
back to her, their voices growing louder with each one. When it 
was time for Smith-Holt to speak the name of her son Alec, who 
died in 2017 at age twenty-six after rationing his insulin, her com-
posure broke. She started sobbing. She took a deep breath, and 
yelled, “Justice for Alec!” Smith-Holt was then arrested for blocking 
traffic.3 
                                                   
 1. See generally T1INTERNATIONAL: #INSULIN4ALL USA, https://www.
t1international.com/blog/category/usa-insulin4all (last visited May 28, 2020). 
 2. T1INTERNATIONAL, Costs and Rationing of Insulin and Diabetes Supplies: Findings from 
the 2018 T1International Patient Survey 6 (2018), https://www.t1international.com/ 
media/assets/file/T1International_Report_-_Costs_and_Rationing_of_Insulin__Diabetes_
Supplies_2.pdf. 
 3. Mike Hoskins, Diabetes Advocate Forces Police Arrest at Insulin Vigil, HEALTHLINE  
(Sept. 19, 2019), https://www.healthline.com/diabetesmine/diabetes-advocate-arrest-
insulin-vigil#1; T1International, T1International #insulin4all Vigil 2019, YOUTUBE (Oct. 21, 
2019), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=IECE592N1bU. 
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Nearly one in three Americans say they have skipped medication 
doses in the past year due to cost.4 Thirty-four million Americans 
say they personally know someone who died from the inability to 
pay for medicines or other care.5 Hospital emergency rooms across 
the country regularly see patients in crisis because they could not 
afford their asthma inhaler, blood pressure medicines, or insulin.6
Globally, the United Nations estimates that nearly two billion peo-
ple do not receive the medications they need, including children 
who go without vaccines. Ten million of those people, approxi-
mately the population of New York City, die each year because 
medicines are unaffordable to them.7
This suffering stands in contrast to the robust health of the for-
profit pharmaceutical industry. Although most medicines are 
manufactured at costs of just pennies per dose, corporations hold 
government-granted patent monopolies on many of them, ena-
bling prices to be set at levels that are hundreds and even thou-
sands of times higher than their cost.8 U.S. drug prices are the 
highest in the world and are raised annually at a rate far beyond 
overall inflation.9 As a result, the pharmaceutical industry is one of
the most profitable sectors in modern times, with annual corporate 
profit margins reaching as high as forty percent.10
Consider the case of insulin, the medicine that Alec Raeshawn-
Smith and the other young Americans eulogized on that Indian-
apolis street corner could not afford. A vial of insulin that cost 
pharmaceutical corporations only about $6 to manufacture has in-
4. Ashley Kirzinger et al., KFF Health Tracking Poll – February 2019: Prescription Drugs,
KAISER FAM. FOUND. (June 11, 2019), https://www.kff.org/health-reform/poll-finding/kff-
health-tracking-poll-february-2019-prescription-drugs.
5. Dan Witters, Millions in U.S. Lost Someone Who Couldn’t Afford Treatment, GALLUP
(Nov. 12, 2019), https://news.gallup.com/poll/268094/millions-lost-someone-couldn-
afford-treatment.aspx.
6. See Kohei Hasegawa et al., Emergency Department Visits for Acute Asthma by Adults Who 
Ran Out of Their Inhaled Medications, 35 ALLERGY & ASTHMA PROC. e42, e49 (2014).
7. Paul Hunt (Special Rapporteur on the Right to Health), Promotion and Protection of 
Human Rights: Human Rights Questions, Including Alternative Approaches for Improving the Effec-
tive Enjoyment of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, U.N. Doc. A/63/263 at 15 (Aug. 11, 
2008), http://www.who.int/medicines/areas/human_rights/A63_263.pdf.
8. See Andrew Hill et al., Minimum Costs for Producing Hepatitis C Direct-Acting Antivirals
for Use in Large-Scale Treatment Access Programs in Developing Countries, 58 CLINICAL INFECTIOUS 
DISEASES 928, 928–36 (2014); Dzintars Gotham et al., Production Costs and Potential Prices for 
Biosimilars of Human Insulin and Insulin Analogues, BRIT. MED. J. GLOBAL HEALTH, Sept. 25,
2018, at 1, 3, https://gh.bmj.com/content/3/5/e000850.full.pdf.
9. Dena Bunis, Prescription Drug Prices Increase by Double the Rate of Inflation, AARP 
(Sept. 19, 2019), https://www.aarp.org/politics-society/advocacy/info-2019/prescription-
drug-price-report.html; STAFF OF H. WAYS AND MEANS COMM., 116TH CONG., A PAINFUL PILL 
TO SWALLOW: U.S. VS. INTERNATIONAL PRESCRIPTION DRUG PRICES 6 (2019), https://waysand
means.house.gov/sites/democrats.waysandmeans.house.gov/files/documents/U.S.%20vs.
%20International%20Prescription%20Drug%20Prices_0.pdf.
10. Richard Anderson, Pharmaceutical Industry Gets High on Fat Profits, BBC NEWS (Nov. 
6, 2014), https://www.bbc.com/news/business-28212223.
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creased in price more than one thousand percent in recent years. 
That single vial is now priced as high as $300.11 Most Americans 
with Type 1 diabetes face medicine and supplies costs of $1300 a 
month or more.12 The three corporations that dominate the global 
insulin market report annual profits that are double the average of 
other Fortune 500 companies.13
The crowd gathered in front of the Eli Lilly and Company head-
quarters reflected the mood of the U.S. public: Americans are fu-
rious. Multiple polls show U.S. respondents identifying medicine 
costs as the top issue Congress should tackle.14 Americans are in-
creasingly aware of their government’s role in funding the discov-
ery of drugs, granting monopoly patents on those discoveries to 
private companies, and then paying, through Medicare and other 
government programs, the monopoly mark-up price for the medi-
cines produced. “Taxpayers paying twice” has become a refrain re-
peated by politicians and advocates.15
The same polls show that Americans are ready for a bold re-
sponse to the crisis. Eighty-four percent support breaking patent 
monopolies to allow for production of lower-cost medicines.16 Two-
thirds support making prescription drugs public goods paid for by 
the federal government.17 The U.S. public’s demands are not out-
landish. They are fully in line with the global legacy of treating 
prescription medicines as a public good and with U.S. law and his-
tory justifying swift nationalization of private industry in a time of 
crisis. The United States can nationalize its pharmaceutical indus-
try, and it should.
11. Ed Silverman, Insulin Prices Could Be Much Lower and Drug Makers Would Still Make 
Healthy Profits, STAT (Sept. 25, 2018), https://www.statnews.com/pharmalot/2018/09/25
/insulin-prices-profits-diabetes.
12. Cf. Peter Callaghan, How the Death of Alec Smith Pushed Minnesota Lawmakers to Address 
The Rising Cost of Insulin, MINNPOST (Jan. 23, 2019), https://www.minnpost.com/state-
government/2019/01/how-the-death-of-alec-smith-pushed-minnesota-lawmakers-to-address-
the-rising-cost-of-insulin.
13. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., GAO-18-40, DRUG INDUSTRY: PROFITS, RESEARCH 
AND DEVELOPMENT SPENDING, AND MERGER AND ACQUISITION DEALS (2017), 
https://www.gao.gov/assets/690/688472.pdf.
14. Ashley Kirzinger et al., KFF Health Tracking Poll - September 2019: Health Care Policy in
Congress and on the Campaign Trail, KAISER FAM. FOUND. (Sept. 12, 2019), 
https://www.kff.org/health-costs/poll-finding/kff-health-tracking-poll-september-2019.
15. Robert Pear, ‘Paying Twice’: A Push for Affordable Prices for Taxpayer-Funded Drugs,
N.Y. TIMES (May 28, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/05/28/us/politics/drug-prices
.html.
16. HART RESEARCH ASSOCS., PRESCRIPTION DRUG PRICES: THE VOTER SPEAKS
2 (2019), https://craftmediabucket.s3.amazonaws.com/uploads/AV-Summary-of-Polling-
Project_052119_FINAL.pdf.
17. LAKE RESEARCH PARTNERS & ASO COMMC’NS, PUBLIC SUPPORT FOR PRESCRIPTION 
DRUG PRICE REFORM: FINDINGS FROM A SURVEY OF 1,503 AMERICAN ADULTS 3 (2016).
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I. THE FALLACY OF MEDICINE PATENTS INCENTIVIZING INNOVATION
The pharmaceutical industry’s justification for retaining the cur-
rent system and rejecting a public pharmaceutical model is that pa-
tent monopolies and the inflated prices they enable are necessary 
to spur life-saving innovation in medicines research.18 There is a 
fundamental flaw in that argument. The true innovators in medi-
cines discovery are not the holders of those monopolies, but rather 
the entities that award them: governments.
Governments are far and away the dominant funder of the basic 
science research that makes up the earliest stage of the medicines 
development process, the riskiest and most lengthy component of 
medicines discovery.19 The U.S. National Institutes of Health 
(NIH) has an annual budget of $40 billion that is largely devoted 
to funding the early-stage research that creates the building blocks 
for follow-on development of medicines.20 Virtually every signifi-
cant pharmaceutical breakthrough of the past half-century has 
government provenance, and each of the 210 new drugs approved 
by the U.S. Food and Drug Administration from 2010 to 2016 trac-
es its roots back to government-funded research.21 Of course, the 
critical role played by government funding is not limited to the 
medicines field. The internet, the discovery of the chemical struc-
ture of DNA, and breakthroughs in nuclear energy were all based 
on publicly funded research.22
Until the 1980s, U.S.-financed research breakthroughs were ei-
ther owned by the federal agency that funded them or placed in 
the public domain.23 But today, those discoveries end up in private, 
for-profit hands complete with long-term patent monopolies. The 
18. See, e.g., PHRMA, IMPLICATIONS OF SPEAKER PELOSI’S DRUG PRICING PLAN 10 (2019), 
https://www.phrma.org/-/media/Project/PhRMA/PhRMA-Org/PhRMA-Org/PDF/Media-
Briefing-Slides-on-HR-3_101019-FINAL.pdf.
19. See MARIANA MAZZUCATO, THE ENTREPRENEURIAL STATE: DEBUNKING PUBLIC VS.
PRIVATE SECTOR MYTHS 73–77 (2015).
20. See Budget, NAT’L INSTS. HEALTH, https://www.nih.gov/about-nih/what-we-do/
budget (last reviewed May 20, 2020).
21. See, e.g., Aaron S. Kesselheim et al., The Roles of Academia, Rare Diseases, and Repurpos-
ing in the Development of the Most Transformative Drugs, 34 HEALTH AFF. 286, 286 
(2015); Bhaven N. Sampat & Frank R. Lichtenberg, What Are the Respective Roles of the Public 
and Private Sectors in Pharmaceutical Innovation?, 30 HEALTH AFF. 332, 334
(2011), https://www.healthaffairs.org/doi/10.1377/hlthaff.2009.0917; History of Medicine 
Timeline, DATESANDEVENTS.ORG, http://www.datesandevents.org/events-timelines/10-
history-of-medicine-timeline.htm (last visited June 27, 2020); A Question of Utility, THE 
ECONOMIST, Aug. 8, 2015, at 50–52.
22. Peter Drahos & John Braithwaite, Who Owns the Knowledge Economy? Political Organis-
ing Behind TRIPS, THE CORNER HOUSE (Sept. 30, 2004), at 26, http://www.thecorner
house.org.uk/resource/who-owns-knowledge-economy.
23. Lorelei Ritchie de Larena, The Price of Progress: Are Universities Adding to the Cost, 43 
HOUS. L. REV. 1373, 1378 (2007).
SUMMER 2020] Tell Me How It Ends 761 
 
change came about with the 1980 passage of the Patent and 
Trademark Law Amendments Act, more commonly known as the 
Bayh-Dole Act.24 Pushed by the pharmaceutical industry, Congress 
decided to allow universities and corporations that receive federal 
research funding to claim patents for the discoveries that come out 
of that research. The result is that private companies benefit from 
a process that socializes the risks of medicines research and privat-
izes its rewards. As economist Marianna Mazzucato says, the United 
States “invests in the most uncertain stage of the business cycle and 
lets businesses hop on for the easier ride down the way.”25  
Government support for the pharmaceutical development pro-
cess does not end at the early research stage. In addition to their 
patent rights, pharmaceutical corporations are often eligible for 
tax credits as high as fifty percent to support their follow-on re-
search.26 In addition, the government provides corporations with 
tax deductions for the cost of clinical trials.27 And one in four med-
icines benefit from direct government support for that late-stage 
research as well.28 
                                                   
 24. Bayh-Dole Act, 35 U.S.C. §§ 200–12 (2012). 
 25. MAZZUCATO, supra note 19, at 1. The COVID-19 pandemic provides an example of 
this phenomenon. Before the pandemic outbreak in 2020, the NIH had already invested 
almost $700 million into the coronavirus research that is the foundation for the vaccine and 
therapeutics research being conducted. Government Funds Coronavirus Research While  
Pharma Sits By, PUB. CITIZEN (Feb. 20, 2020), https://www.citizen.org/news 
/government-funds-coronavirus-research-while-pharma-sits-by. In March 2020, Congress al-
located $3 billion more for this research. Lauren Hirsch & Kevin Breuniger, Trump Signs 
$8.3 Billion Emergency Coronavirus Spending Package, CNBC (Mar. 6, 2020), 
https://www.cnbc.com/2020/03/06/trump-signs-8point3-billion-emergency-coronavirus-
spending-package.html. Patient activists worried that the current pharmaceutical develop-
ment model meant that even this enormous public investment would not ensure that the 
resulting treatments would be affordable. “Once government funded research identifies a 
vaccine or treatment, under current policy, a drug corporation will bring the product to 
market at any price—and without regard to the taxpayer’s integral role in its discovery.” Da-
vid Mitchell, COVID-19 Treatments Won’t Work if We Can’t Afford Them, PATIENTS FOR 
AFFORDABLE DRUGS (Mar. 28, 2020),  https://www.patientsforaffordabledrugs.org/2020/
03/26/covid-19. 
 26. See Zachary Brennan, Senate, House Agree to Cut Orphan Drug Research Credit in Half in 
Tax Bill, RAPS: REG. FOCUS (Dec. 18, 2017), https://www.raps.org/regulatory-focus%E2%84 
%A2/news-articles/2017/12/senate,-house-agree-to-cut-orphan-drug-research-credit-in-half-
in-tax-bill. 
 27. See Thomas Moore et al., Estimated Costs of Pivotal Trials for Novel Therapeutic Agents 
Approved by the US Food and Drug Administration, 2015-2016, JAMA INTERNAL MED. (Sept. 24, 
2018) (finding that clinical trials that support FDA approvals of new drugs have a median 
cost of $19 million, far lower than the industry’s claims for the costs of trials). 
 28. Rahul K. Nayak et al., Public Sector Financial Support for Late Stage Discovery of New 
Drugs in the United States: Cohort Study, BRIT. MED. J. (2019), https://www.bmj.com/content/ 
367/bmj.l5766; see generally James B. Krellenstein, Taxpayer Funded Development of Truvada as 
PrEP, THE PREP4ALL COLLABORATION (May, 2019) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with 
the University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform) (providing an example of publicly-
funded clinical trials). 
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Predictably, private research dollars focus more on profit-
seeking than public health. Of the drugs receiving FDA approval 
from 2005 to 2016, only thirteen percent addressed an unmet 
medical need or helped advance patient care. The rest were so-
called “me too” drugs, providing little to no therapeutic benefit 
over products already available to consumers.29 The intent is to 
carve out a share of an existing lucrative market, which is under-
standable from a corporate standpoint but wasteful from a public 
benefit perspective. Just as predictably, for-profit research concen-
trates on the development of medicines that can be sold at a high 
mark-up to wealthy consumers.30 The current system provides no 
incentive for research that addresses the needs of the global poor. 
Of the 1,556 new chemical entities marketed between 1975 and 
2004, only twenty-one were for tropical, sometimes known as “ne-
glected,” diseases that primarily impact persons in developing 
countries.31
When direct government support and tax subsidies are all ac-
counted for, some analysts estimate that private corporations pay 
for only one third of U.S. biomedical research.32 And the research 
that is sponsored by private corporations is often tainted by inap-
propriate methodology and selective reporting of findings, includ-
ing the suppression of negative results, motivated by the drive for 
29. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., GAO-18-40, DRUG INDUSTRY: PROFITS, RESEARCH 
AND DEVELOPMENT SPENDING, AND MERGER AND ACQUISITION DEALS 41–42 (2017), 
https://www.gao.gov/assets/690/688472.pdf; Victoria Costello, Talking about Drug Prices & 
Access to Medicines Pt 1: By Els Torreele, Open Society Foundations, PLOS BLOGS (Oct. 13, 2015), 
https://blogs.plos.org/yoursay/2015/10/13/talking-about-drug-prices-access-to-medicines.
30. Importantly, even the later stage development of patented medicines is rarely con-
ducted by the companies that hold their rights: a recent report showed that eighty-one per-
cent of two leading corporations’ products listed in 2017 were developed elsewhere, at 
which time the large corporations—using resources earned from other drugs’ patent-
inflated pricing—purchased their rights. Emily H. Jung et al., Do Large Pharma 
Companies Provide Drug Development Innovation? Our Analysis Says No, STAT (Dec. 10, 2019), 
https://www.statnews.com/2019/12/10/large-pharma-companies-provide-little-new-drug-
development-innovation.
31. Pierre Chirac & Els Torrele, Global Framework on Essential Health R&D, 367 LANCET 
1560, 1560 (May 13, 2006), https://www.thelancet.com/journals/lancet/article/PIIS0140-
6736(06)68672-8/fulltext. One of the casualties of this model is the lack of financial incen-
tive for for-profit pharmaceutical corporations to develop vaccines, antibiotics, and other 
responses to infectious diseases, in part because the widespread need for—and purchase 
of—such treatments is not assured, and in part because the affected population may be too 
poor to afford high treatment costs. In the case of both Ebola and COVID-19, this dynamic 
slowed development of promising treatments before the outbreaks occurred. Julia Belluz, 
Umair Ifan & Brian Resnick, A Guide to the Vaccines and Drugs That Could Fight Coronavirus,
VOX (Mar. 27, 2020), https://www.vox.com/science-and-health/2020/3/4/21154590/
coronavirus-vaccine-treatment-covid-19-drug-cure.
32. Michele Boldrin & David K. Levine, The Case Against Patents, 27 J. ECON. PERSP. 15, 
15–16 (2013), https://pubs.aeaweb.org/doi/pdf/10.1257/jep.27.1.3.
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profits instead of public health concerns.33 Economist Dean Baker 
has calculated that if lawmakers withdrew the patent monopolies 
that support massive price mark-ups for medicines, the resulting 
savings would allow every dollar of privately funded medicines re-
search and development to be more than matched by increased 
government investment. That investment could be focused on pub-
lic health rather than profit-seeking.34 
It is worth noting that the fallacy of patent-motivated innovation 
is not limited to the medicines field. Patents are artificially-
imposed zones of exclusivity acting as an “anti-commons” by block-
ing the follow-on use of information that could lead to further in-
novation.35 As a result, multiple studies have shown monopolies are 
not only ineffective at incentivizing innovation, but they are also a 
barrier to follow-on discoveries.36 By contrast, most of history’s 
great innovations have occurred outside the patent system.37 Anal-
yses of the effects of compulsory licensing, where a government 
overrides a patent and allows generic production, show that these 
patent bypasses open up the field and encourage innovation.38 
One of the anti-innovation effects of patents is to incentivize the 
creation of barriers to discovery, such as the voluminous patent 
“thickets” created by pharmaceutical corporations in the pursuit of 
extended monopolies. A 2018 report by Initiative for Medicines, 
Access and Knowledge (I-MAK) revealed that the twelve top-selling 
drugs in the United States average a remarkable 125 patent appli-
cations per drug, many of them frivolous.39 The effect of this thick-
eting is that each drug carries an average of thirty-eight years of at-
tempted patent protections—far beyond the baseline twenty-year 
                                                   
 33. Adam Gaffney and Joel Lexchin, Healing an Ailing Pharmaceutical System: Prescription 
for Reform for United States and Canada, BRIT. MED. J., May 17, 2018, at 2, 9, 
12, https://doi.org/10.1136/bmj.k1039. Gaffney and Lexchin also point to concerns that 
the U.S. drug review and approval process has been corrupted by the Food and Drug Ad-
ministration’s fiscal reliance on fees paid by pharmaceutical companies. Id. at 11. 
 34. DEAN BAKER, RIGGED: HOW GLOBALIZATION AND THE RULES OF THE MODERN 
ECONOMY WERE STRUCTURED TO MAKE THE RICH RICHER 106–16 (2006). 
 35. Micheal A. Heller & Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Can Patents Deter Innovation? The Anti-
commons in Biomedical Research, 280 SCI. MAG. 698, 698–701 (1998), https://science 
.sciencemag.org/content/280/5364/698. 
 36. DEAN BAKER ET AL., CTR. FOR ECON. & POLICY RESEARCH, INNOVATION, 
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY, AND DEVELOPMENT: A BETTER SET OF APPROACHES FOR THE  
21ST CENTURY 10 (2017), http://cepr.net/images/stories/reports/baker-jayadev-stiglitz-
innovation-ip-development-2017-07.pdf. 
 37. Petra Moser, Patents and Innovation in Economic History 9–11, 16–17 (Nat’l Bureau of 
Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 21964, 2016), http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/
ssrn.2712428. 
 38. Id. 
 39. I-MAK, OVERPATENTED, OVERPRICED: HOW EXCESSIVE PHARMACEUTICAL PATENTING 
IS EXTENDING MONOPOLIES AND DRIVING UP DRUG PRICES (2018), http://www.i-mak.org/wp-
content/uploads/2018/08/I-MAK-Overpatented-Overpriced-Report.pdf. 
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patent life.40 For example, Sanofi, which sells Lantus, a long-acting 
insulin relied upon by persons with Type 1 diabetes, has taken out 
seventy-four patents on the drug.41 Sixty-nine of those patents were 
obtained not during the development process, but after the insulin 
was already on the market.42 This protectionism clashes with the 
well-established benefits of open access practices like creative 
commons licenses, open access journals, and especially the open-
source-software movement that has contributed to transformative 
innovations in the fields of healthcare, education, and communica-
tion.43 
The U.S. Supreme Court’s 2013 decision in Ass’n for Molecular 
Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, Inc. is a powerful example of the posi-
tive effects on innovation when patent barriers are removed.44 The 
Court’s ruling, that naturally-occurring genes could not be patent-
ed, enabled research on a previously patent-protected gene that 
increases the probability of breast cancer. The new research quick-
ly led to more accurate testing for the gene at lower prices.45 Asso-
ciation for Molecular Pathology was part of a comprehensive 2017 
review of the current medicines patenting system by economists 
Dean Baker, Arjun Jayadev, and Joseph Stiglitz. They concluded 
that the system should be radically revised, if not completely aban-
doned: 
Intellectual Property Rights are not an end in themselves 
but only a means towards greater economic welfare for all. 
We tolerate and sanction known economic inefficiencies 
such as those that arise from the private monopolies that 
are created and sustained through the IPR regime as a 
                                                   
 40. Id. at 2. 
 41. I-MAK, OVERPATENTED, OVERPRICED: LANTUS SPECIAL EDITION (2018), http://www.
i-mak.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/10/I-MAK-Lantus-Report-2018-10-30F.pdf. 
 42. Id. at 4. 
 43. See Aseem Sharma, The Impact of Open Source on Business and Social Good, 
OPENSOURCE.COM (Feb. 4, 2013), https://opensource.com/business/13/1/impact-open-
source-business; cf. JÜRGEN BITZER & P. J. H. SCHRÖDER, The Impact of Entry and Competition by 
Open Source Software on Innovation Activity, in THE ECONOMICS OF OPEN SOURCE SOFTWARE 
DEVELOPMENT 219, 242–44 (2013). 
 44. Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, Inc., 569 U.S. 576 (2013). 
 45. See BAKER ET AL., supra note 36, at 14 (citing Ass’n for Molecular Pathology, 569 U.S. 
576). In response to the COVID-19 pandemic, researchers made public calls for open shar-
ing of data to speed discovery of treatments and vaccines and to ensure the safety and effica-
cy of new discoveries that will come from the flurry of research activity. E. Richard Gold, The 
Coronavirus Pandemic Has Shattered the Status Quo on Drug Development. We Should Build on That, FORTUNE 
(Mar. 26, 2020), https://fortune.com/2020/03/26/coronavirus-vaccine-drug-development-
open-science-covid-19-treatment; Christopher J. Morten et al., To Help Develop the Safest, Most 
Effective Coronavirus Tests, Treatments, and Vaccines, Ensure Public Access to Clinical Research Data, 
HEALTH AFF. (Mar. 26, 2020), https://www.healthaffairs.org/do/10.1377/hblog20200326 
.869114/full. 
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gamble in this regard. Our contention is that this gamble 
has not paid adequate dividends.46
II. MEDICINES AS A PUBLIC GOOD
Fortunately, an alternative to the patent system exists. Instead of 
treating life-essential medicines as for-profit commodities ripe for 
monopolizing and price-gouging, they should be treated as public 
goods available to all. Considering medicines as public goods is 
consistent with both economic theory and the multi-century, global 
legacy of preventing private entities from monopolizing and price-
gouging drugs that are essential for life and health.
Economists define public goods as being non-rivalrous, meaning 
any person can benefit from the good without reducing the oppor-
tunity of others to benefit. Public goods are also non-excludable, 
meaning a person cannot be prevented from consuming the good 
in question.47 The classic example of a non-rivalrous, non-
excludable public good is a lighthouse. One ship benefitting from 
its warning does not prevent any other ship from enjoying the 
same benefit, and the lighthouse’s warnings are open to all. Collec-
tively, U.S. society has determined that no one should die because 
they cannot afford privately-set prices for fire and disaster re-
sponse, police protection, or safety inspections for food and water. 
Government action has instead placed services like law enforce-
ment, fire response, and public health protections, along with tan-
gible goods like infrastructure and parks in the category of public 
goods.
Essential medicines should be on that list. Medicines fit the def-
inition of a public good; although an individual pill is available to 
only one person, the formula for creating it can be widely shared. 
Overall, knowledge is a classic public good because its distribution 
demands no sacrifice from its original owner. Medicines possess 
another core quality of public goods: positive externalities.48 One 
person’s consumption of an essential medicine provides clear soci-
46. BAKER ET AL., supra note 36, at 70.
47. Fran Quigley, Corporations Killed Medicine. Here’s How to Take It Back, THE NATION
(Feb. 12, 2016), https://www.thenation.com/article/corporations-killed-medicine-heres-
how-to-take-it-back; see also Brook Baker & Tenu Avafia, The Evolution of IPRs from Humble Be-
ginnings to the Modern Day TRIPS-plus Era: Implications for Treatment Access (Tech. Advisory 
Grp. of the Glob. Comm’n on HIV & the Law, Working Paper, 2011), 
http://www.hivlawcommission.org/index.php/working-papers?task=document.viewdoc&id=
101.
48. Quigley, supra note 47.
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etal benefits beyond the direct consumer. For example, vaccines 
halt the spread of disease and effective treatment leads to greater 
productivity.
So, it is no surprise that human societies have been treating 
medicines as a public good for centuries. The notion of intellectu-
al property only began to achieve broad acceptance in the last 150 
years. But even as nations signed on to the 1883 Paris Convention, 
the 1886 Berne Convention, and the United Nations’ World Intel-
lectual Property Organization in 1967, many deliberately chose to 
exclude medicines from the items eligible for patent protection.49
For example, Germany’s patent law of 1877 labeled medicines, 
along with food and chemicals, as “essential goods” and prohibited 
any attempts to patent them.50 During the mid-20th century, India, 
Brazil, Mexico, and several other Central and South American 
countries adopted explicit limits on the patentability of medi-
cines.51
European countries like Italy and Sweden did not grant phar-
maceutical patents until the 1970s, and Spain refused to do so until 
1992.52 Even in nations that allowed medicine patents, liberal ac-
cess to compulsory licenses for patented drugs was common.53
Compulsory licenses bypass patents by allowing the government to 
either directly manufacture the patented invention or to license 
another entity to manufacture it, with a royalty paid to the patent-
holder. In the mid-20th century, Canada issued hundreds of li-
censes to import or manufacture pharmaceutical products. During 
the same period, even the United States issued dozens of compul-
sory licenses for medicines.54 The law reflected the culture. When 
asked why he sold his patent for insulin for just $1 in 1923, Nobel 
laureate Frederick Banting said that “insulin does not belong to 
me; it belongs to the world.”55 When Jonas Salk was asked in 1952 
why he did not seek a patent on the polio vaccine, he replied, 
“could you patent the sun?”56
But, in the late 20th century, the pharmaceutical industry 
launched a concerted attack on this centuries-long tradition. Lev-
eraging its lobbying and political power in the United States, where
49. Id.
50. Id.
51. Id.
52. Id.
53. See Baker & Avafia, supra note 47, at 4–5.
54. See Hannah Brennan et al., A Prescription for Excessive Drug Pricing: Leveraging Govern-
ment Patent Use for Health, 18 YALE J. LAW & TECH 275, 305–06 (2016).
55. Sir Fredrick Banting, MD, CANADIAN MEDICAL HALL OF FAME,
http://www.cdnmedhall.org/inductees/frederickbanting (last visited Mar. 26, 2020).
56. GLOBAL CITIZEN, Could You Patent the Sun?, YOUTUBE (Jan. 29, 2013), https://www
.youtube.com/watch?v=erHXKP386Nk.
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much of the industry is located, corporations convinced successive 
presidential administrations to prioritize intellectual property pro-
tection in all trade negotiations. Nations that did not provide “ad-
equate and effective” protection for U.S. patents, a term created by 
the pharmaceutical industry-supported 1984 U.S. Trade Act, faced 
severe sanctions.57 Soon after the law was passed, the United States 
placed India and Brazil, two countries that resisted medicine pa-
tents most vigorously, on its “priority” watch list, a precursor to 
trade sanctions.58
At the same time, the World Trade Organization in 1986 con-
vened talks to create a global intellectual property pact, which 
eventually became the 1994 Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects 
of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS Agreement). When the ne-
gotiations began, nearly half of the countries involved blocked pa-
tents for medicines and most of the rest had established strict lim-
its on their use. But the United States aggressively pressured its 
trade partners, many of whom relied heavily on the economic val-
ue of the trading relationship, to change their approach. The re-
sult: by 1994, one hundred and twenty-three countries signed on to 
TRIPS, which established a twenty-year global baseline for patent 
protections for inventions, including medicines.59
Yet the longtime character of medicines as public goods was not 
fully extinguished. The TRIPS Agreement protects national rights 
to bypass patents by way of compulsory licenses or importation of 
medicines, especially when public health is at stake.60 And the post-
TRIPS medicines system continues to be the antithesis of a laissez-
faire market model, given the massive government subsidies for re-
search, bulk government purchases of medicines, and widespread,
if not comprehensive, government provision of medicines to their 
citizens at low or no cost.61
As Dana Brown chronicled in her discussion of the extensive 
benefits to be gained from public ownership of the pharmaceutical 
process, Sweden, Brazil, Cuba, Thailand, China, and other nations 
embrace public ownership of key components of their medicines 
57. 19 U.S.C. § 2242 (2012); see Sean Flynn, What is Special 301? A Historical Primer,
INFOJUSTICE (May 1, 2013), http://infojustice.org/archives/29465.
58. Flynn, supra note 57; Quigley, supra note 47.
59. Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, art. 33 (1994), 
https://www.wto.org/english/docs_e/legal_e/27-trips_01_e.htm [hereinafter TRIPS 
Agreement].
60. Id. at art. 31.
61. See Alfred B. Engelberg, How Government Policy Promotes High Drug Prices, HEALTH 
AFF. (Oct. 29, 2015), https://www.healthaffairs.org/do/10.1377/hblog20151029.051488/
full.
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system.62 Much of this enduring character of medicines as public 
goods reflects popular demand. U.S.-focused activism in the 1980s 
and 1990s led to groundbreaking government-funded discoveries 
in HIV/AIDS treatment. And global activism in the early 2000s led 
to governments bypassing patents on those discoveries and directly 
providing treatment to millions at zero cost.63 
The public good roots of medicines are alive, and they can be 
nurtured as an alternative to the current system that is weighed 
down by private interests and monopoly distortions. The savings 
gained from removing the massive patent-created profits from the 
system can fund alternative mechanisms for innovation, including 
expanded publicly-funded research, like the enormously successful 
programs of the NIH, increased tax credits or deductions that sub-
sidize private research as it occurs, prize funds to reward ground-
breaking innovations with cash instead of monopoly rights, and 
other non-profit approaches.64 
The legacy of the NIH, along with that of the National Science 
Foundation and the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency 
(creator of the internet), prove the effectiveness of publicly funded 
approaches to innovation. So too does the non-profit, government-
supported track record of organizations devoted to drug develop-
ment. For example, the Drugs for Neglected Diseases Initiative has 
led over forty research and development projects and delivered 
eight highly impactful treatments, with twenty new chemical enti-
ties in its pipeline.65 And the Mario Negri Institute’s researchers 
                                                   
 62. DANA BROWN, DEMOCRACY COLLABORATIVE, MEDICINE FOR ALL: THE CASE FOR A 
PUBLIC OPTION IN THE PHARMACEUTICAL INDUSTRY, Sept. 2019, https://thenextsystem.org/
sites/default/files/2019-09/MedicineforAll_WEB.pdf; Linda McQuaig, That Time Canada 
Had A Public Lab that Made Life-Saving Drugs, THE TYEE (Nov. 8, 2019), https://thetyee.ca/
Analysis/2019/11/08/Canada-Public-Lab-Life-Saving-Drugs/?utm_source=national&utm_
medium=email&utm_campaign=141119. Brown discusses the pharmaceutical nationaliza-
tion process in Sweden (existing private corporations transformed into state-owned compa-
nies, which was later split into two state-owned companies) and Cuba (existing companies 
consolidated under the Ministry of Health). BROWN, supra, at 35–36, 57–58. Those exam-
ples, and the more advanced discussion of the fate of insurance companies under a single-
payer Medicare for All–type transformation, can inform the pharmaceutical transformation 
process in the United States. For example, there are proposals for absorbing some private 
insurance employees into a government-run system while retraining or offering early re-
tirement to others. See Robert Pollin et al., Economic Analysis of Medicare for All, PERI U. MASS. 
108–19 (Nov. 30, 2018), https://www.peri.umass.edu/publication/item/1127-economic-
analysis-of-medicare-for-all. Similarly, a nationalized pharmaceutical system would likely re-
tain—or even expand—the private research-focused workforce but would need to retrain or 
transition most sales and marketing personnel. 
 63. See generally, RAYMOND A. SMITH & PATRICIA D. SIPLON, DRUGS INTO BODIES: GLOBAL 
AIDS TREATMENT ACTIVISM (2006). 
 64. Fran Quigley, Making Medicines Accessible: Alternatives to the Flawed Patent System, 
HEALTH & HUM. RTS. J. (Nov. 23, 2015), https://www.hhrjournal.org/2015/11/making-
medicines-accessible-alternatives-to-the-flawed-patent-system-2. 
 65. Fran Quigley, Escaping Big Pharma’s Pricing with Patent-Free Drugs, N.Y. TIMES (July 28, 
2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/07/18/opinion/escaping-big-pharmas-pricing-with-
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have published over 12,000 oft-cited articles in scientific journals, 
and average eighty clinical trials being conducted at any one time, 
with over 70,000 patients enrolled.66 
All of these entities offer demonstrated advantages over the cur-
rent model: they prioritize public health over drugs’ potential prof-
itability, they avoid the well-chronicled ethical problems associated 
with research fueled by the profit motive, they allow the fruits of 
research to be available for follow-on discoveries, and they can dis-
tribute medicines at dramatically lower prices as compared to pri-
vate companies.67 
III.  THE UNITED STATES’ HISTORICAL TREATMENT OF PRIVATE 
PROPERTY AND GOVERNMENT SEIZURES SUPPORT NATIONALIZING 
THE PHARMACEUTICAL INDUSTRY 
The United States is often characterized as a society with un-
shakeable reverence for private property rights and a reluctance to 
sanction the government seizing private property for collective use. 
Yet the historical record tells a different story. Local and state gov-
ernments have widely and continually used eminent domain rights, 
and the United States has a lengthy track record of nationalizing 
private companies and entire industries and local and state gov-
ernments. Nationalizing the pharmaceutical industry would be 
consistent with a multi-century legacy of elevating the public good 
over private property rights. 
 
A.  The U.S. Reverence for Private Property: Mythology vs. Reality 
The cultural and political ties between the United States and 
private property date back to the original European settlers in the 
territory, many of whom fled feudalist systems in the hopes of 
claiming and owning their own land.68 From the very beginning, 
                                                   
patent-free-drugs.html; DRUGS FOR NEGLECTED DISEASES INITIATIVE, https://www.dndi.org/
about-dndi (last visited Apr. 10, 2020). 
 66. Fran Quigley, Want Good Pharma? Here is One Example of What it May Look Like, 
HEALTH & HUM. RTS. J. (Dec. 6, 2016), https://sites.sph.harvard.edu/hhrjournal/2016/12/
want-good-pharma-one-example-of-what-that-may-look-like. 
 67. Fran Quigley, Remove the For-Profit Variable from Clinical Drug Trials, HEALTH & HUM. 
RTS. J. (May 21, 2017), https://www.hhrjournal.org/2017/05/remove-the-for-profit-variable-
from-clinical-drug-trials-2. 
 68. LINCOLN INST. LAND POL’Y, PROPERTY RIGHTS AND LAND POLICIES 54 (Gregory  
K. Ingram & Yu-Hung Hong, eds. 2009), https://www.lincolninst.edu/sites/default/ 
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the image of a self-reliant, agrarian colonial American freeholder 
took on powerful political symbolism. Thomas Jefferson was one of 
many of the nation’s founders who equated private property rights 
(for white males) with democracy. John Adams often sparred with 
Jefferson, but on this point they agreed. “Property must be secured 
or liberty cannot exist,” Adams wrote. “The moment the idea is 
admitted into society that property is not as sacred as the laws of 
God, and that there is not a force of law and public justice to pro-
tect it, anarchy and tyranny commence.”69
Those are ringing words, but they only carried so far. Even in 
Adams’ era, local governments were exercising eminent domain 
over private property, and cities barred some businesses from locat-
ing within their boundaries. The American Revolution set the stage 
for widespread seizures of British-held property, including redistri-
bution of two-thirds of New York City and its suburbs.70 Although 
Jefferson and Adams concurred on the preeminence of private 
property, their view was not uniform among their fellow founders. 
Benjamin Franklin said, “private property is a creature of society, 
and is subject to the calls of the society whenever its necessities re-
quire it, even to the last farthing.”71 There is evidence that Jeffer-
son’s original vision for the Declaration of Independence echoed 
John Locke’s call for protection of “life, liberty, and property,” but 
the reference to property was replaced with “pursuit of happiness” 
by the drafting committee, which included Franklin.72
Thirteen years later, the Fifth Amendment to the U.S. Constitu-
tion balanced those competing interests, sanctioning in its Takings 
Clause both public appropriation of private property and the right 
of those property holders to be reimbursed: “Nor shall private 
property be taken for public use, without just compensation.”73 As 
the industrial revolution and the urbanization of the country led to 
more regulation and seizures of private property, generations of 
Supreme Court justices were left to interpret the Amendment’s 
reference to both private property and just compensation. The 
Court’s conclusions usually ran counter to the cultural notion of 
the United States as a private property-focused nation.
files/pubfiles/2077_1400_LP2008-ch03-U.S.-Private-Property-Rights-in-International-
Perspective_0.pdf.
69. Id.
70. Gerald Friedman, The Sanctity of Property Rights in American History 5 (Political Econ. 
Research Inst., Working Paper No. 14, 2001), https://scholarworks.umass.edu/cgi/view
content.cgi?article=1008&context=peri_workingpapers.
71. Carol V. Hamilton, Why Did Jefferson Change “Property” to the “Pursuit of Happiness”?,
HIST. NEWS NETWORK (Jan. 27, 2008), https://historynewsnetwork.org/article/46460;
LINCOLN INST. LAND POL’Y, supra note 68, at 55.
72. Id.
73. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
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In a recent example, in the 2005 case Kelo v. City of New London,
the U.S. Supreme Court affirmed the city’s Fifth Amendment right 
to seize private property, even if the “public use” was to redistribute 
the property to other private entities in the name of economic de-
velopment.74 The decision triggered a public backlash in support 
of private property rights, including dozens of state legislative ef-
forts to prohibit government takings for mere economic develop-
ment purposes or private gain. Many takings limits were adopted in 
state legislation or construed by state courts to exist in state consti-
tutions.75
It should be noted that the post-Kelo debate and the subsequent 
state law limitations would not impact the seizure of pharmaceuti-
cal industry assets envisioned here. That debate aims at the outer 
boundaries of the Court’s interpretation of public use and public 
purpose, while the seizures called for here are squarely in the mul-
ti-century tradition of takings for public use. These takings will not 
be conducted for broad non-governmental economic development 
purposes and they will not result in gain for other private interests, 
the characteristics that triggered the backlash against the Kelo deci-
sion.
Land policy and property rights historian Harvey Jacobs con-
cluded that the rhetorical bark of property rights advocates in re-
cent decades has proved to be more formidable than their bite. 
“They had been ineffective in changing the fundamental way gov-
ernment at the national, state, and local levels acted toward and 
upon property.”76 Indeed, the U.S. Supreme Court has never re-
jected a government seizure on the grounds that the taking was 
not for “public use.”77
Beyond court decisions, the U.S. cultural and political posture 
venerating private property has long been at odds with the com-
paratively quiet but widespread embrace of public ownership and 
operation of property, goods, and services. The list of publicly
owned entities at the core of U.S. societies is well-known and sub-
stantial enough to deserve noting: public safety (police, fire de-
partments, courts, and prisons), infrastructure (streets, sewers, and 
public utilities that are often the providers of water and electricity), 
schools from pre-kindergarten to post-graduate levels, the postal 
74. 545 U.S. 469, 478 (2005). In 1897, the Supreme Court incorporated the Fifth 
Amendment’s Takings Clause, making it applicable against the states through the Four-
teenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause. Chicago, B. & Q. R. Co. v. Chicago, 166 U.S. 226 
(1897).
75. See Eminent Domain, INST. JUST., https://ij.org/issues/private-property/eminent-
domain (last visited Dec. 26, 2019).
76. LINCOLN INST. LAND POL’Y, supra note 68, at 60.
77. R. George Wright, Fundamental Property Rights, 21 VAL. L. REV. 75, 95 n.93 (1986).
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service, public transportation, and much of the healthcare system 
from local clinics and community hospitals to the nationwide Vet-
erans Administration system.78 A full sixteen percent of the federal 
budget is spent on security and defense costs.79 Although much of 
that funding goes to private contractors, the government typically 
retains intellectual property rights on what is invented and manu-
factured, in contrast to the medicines model.80 Recognizing the 
success of that approach and its ready applicability to the goal of 
developing new medicines, some economists have called for a 
“NASA for Prescription Drugs.”81
One-third of the nation’s real estate is public land—from the 
neighborhood dog run to airports, commercial ports, and the fifty-
two million acres of national parks. Some of that public land makes 
up the interstate highway system, a product of the largest public 
works program in U.S. history. Like many other government pro-
jects, it was made possible by aggressive exercise of eminent do-
main, which is both the most enduring refutation of the preemi-
nence of private property rights in the United States and the most 
widespread use of the government powers secured by the Fifth 
Amendment Takings Clause.
Across the country, governments at all levels routinely use their 
eminent domain power to seize privately held land to further pub-
lic safety, protect the environment, and build or expand roads, 
railways, government buildings, and parks. The Fifth Amendment 
usually mandates compensation be paid for these seizures, but the 
government authority to conduct them is unquestioned.82 As the 
U.S. Supreme Court said in Boom Co. v. Patterson in 1879, the gov-
ernment right to seize private property “requires no constitutional 
78. Admittedly, the list of publicly owned institutions is even larger in many European 
and Asian countries, where rail lines, airlines, banks, internet services and energy companies 
are routinely publicly owned. GAR ALPEROVITZ, WHAT THEN MUST WE DO?: STRAIGHT TALK 
ABOUT THE NEXT AMERICAN REVOLUTION 95 (2013).
79. Policy Basics: Where Do Our Federal Tax Dollars Go?, CTR. BUDGET & POL’Y PRIORITIES,
(Jan 29, 2019), https://www.cbpp.org/research/federal-budget/policy-basics-where-do-our-
federal-tax-dollars-go.
80. See Fran Quigley, Building a NASA for Prescription Drugs, THE NEW REPUBLIC, (May 
2018), https://newrepublic.com/article/148361/building-nasa-prescription-drugs.
81. Id.
82. Some scholars have argued that there is no economic justification for government 
compensation for private losses due to takings. Since losses due to other causes, such as fire 
or natural disaster, are protected against by private insurance, the argument goes, that in-
surance should be the source of protection against takings losses, not government compen-
sation. Louis Kaplow, An Economic Analysis of Legal Transitions, 99 HARV. L. REV. 509, 534–35 
(1986); see generally Laurence Blume & Daniel L. Rubinfeld, Compensation for Takings: An 
Economic Analysis, 72 CALIF. L. REV. 569, 572 (1984) (arguing that without private insurance 
providing this type of coverage, it “may be appropriate for government to provide such in-
surance in the form of compensation”).
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recognition; it is an attribute of sovereignty.”83 The practical justifi-
cation for eminent domain reflects the untenable position a gov-
ernment would inhabit if a private land owner refused to sell, or 
set an exorbitant price for, land needed to build roads, establish 
waterways, place utilities, etc. for the benefit of the public.
The broad disbursement of authority among government enti-
ties to exercise eminent domain means that there is no centralized 
data available on how often it is exercised.84 But historic examples 
reveal its significant scope, beginning with the 19th century Su-
preme Court cases affirming the federal government’s right to 
seize private land to build a Cincinnati post office (Kohl v. United 
States) and a battlefield memorial (United States v. Gettysburg Electric 
Railroad Co.).85 During the New Deal era of the 1930s, the govern-
ment vigorously asserted its eminent domain powers to establish 
national parks and to enable public works programs.86
World War II saw the acquisition of twenty million acres of pri-
vate property for airports, proving grounds, military storage, and 
other defense uses. The Assistant Attorney General of the United 
States called the Lands Division of the Department of Justice, “the 
biggest real estate office of any time or any place.”87 After the war, 
the Federal-Aid Highway Act of 1956, signed into law and enthusi-
astically implemented by Republican President Dwight Eisenhow-
er, set the stage for the United States and other governments to 
exercise eminent domain in more than a half-million instances as 
they constructed the interstate highway system.88
This lengthy and ongoing legacy of government assertion of 
ownership of private property creates a substantial precedent for 
nationalizing the U.S. pharmaceutical industry. While the eminent 
domain examples in particular pertain to real property, Part V will 
show that government use of privately held intellectual property is 
even more well-established in the law.
83. Miss. & Rum River Boom Co. v. Patterson, 98 U.S. 403 (1878).
84. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., GAO-07-28, EMINENT DOMAIN (2006), 
https://www.gao.gov/assets/260/253936.html.
85. Kohl v. United States, 91 U.S. 367 (1875); United States v. Gettysburg Elec. R.R. 
Co., 160 U.S. 668 (1896).
86. See Early Evolution of Eminent Domain, U.S. DEP’T JUST., https://www.justice.gov/enrd
/history-federal-use-eminent-domain.
87. Id.
88. Josh Stephens, Reclaiming the Interstates from Ike, CAL. PLAN. & DEV. REP. (Dec. 8, 
2011), http://www.cp-dr.com/articles/node-3072.
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B.  The U.S. Legacy of Nationalizing Companies and Industries 
Even for those familiar with the widespread use of eminent do-
main in the United States, the nationalization of entire companies 
by converting them from private to public control may seem un-
American. Nationalization is a practice at odds with the political 
and cultural reputation of the United States as an uber-capitalist 
nation. Yet nationalization of companies and even entire industries 
is fully permissible under U.S. law, thanks to the broad powers 
granted to Congress under Article I of the Constitution and Fifth 
Amendment. In its 1952 decision in Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. 
Sawyer, the U.S. Supreme Court underscored this right: “The pow-
er of Congress to adopt such public policies as those proclaimed by 
the order (nationalizing the steel industry) is beyond question. It 
can authorize the taking of private property for public use.”89 
In fact, the U.S. federal government has quite often exercised 
the right to nationalize. As Thomas Hanna writes in his chronicle 
of this legacy, A History of Nationalization in the United States: 1917-
2009, “The United States actually has a long and rich tradition of 
nationalizing private enterprise, especially during times of eco-
nomic and social crisis.”90 Hanna and others cite a pattern that in-
cludes the World War I-era nationalization of the railroad industry, 
which constituted one-twelfth of the U.S. economy at the time, 
along with the nation’s telephone and telegraph networks, the ra-
dio industry, arms manufacturers, and pharmaceutical companies, 
among others.91 During World War II, the U.S. again nationalized 
railroads, along with coal mines, the nation’s gold and silver re-
serves, and manufacturers of airplanes and arms.92 In one high-
profile case, the U.S. government nationalized some components 
of the Montgomery Ward department store chain, complete with 
National Guard troops carrying the resistant company CEO Sewell 
Avery out of his Chicago office.93 
The World War II-era nationalizations were so voluminous that 
for a period in 1945, the government was taking over on average 
one industrial plant per week.94 After the war, nationalization of 
railroads, oil companies, mines, and transportation facilities con-
tinued. Many of these efforts were enabled by the Defense Produc-
                                                   
 89. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 588 (1952). 
 90. THOMAS HANNA, NEXT SYS. PROJECT,  A HISTORY OF NATIONALIZATION IN  
THE UNITED STATES: 1917-2009, at 2 (2019), https://thenextsystem.org/history-of-
nationalization-in-the-us. 
 91. Id. at 4–10. 
 92. Id. at 10–20. 
 93. Id. at 14. 
 94. Id. at 16. 
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tion Act of 1950, which gives the President broad authority to take 
action within the domestic industrial base in response to military 
or disaster response needs.95 The Defense Production Act, which 
includes the rights of the President to assert control over materials, 
services, and facilities, has been repeatedly re-authorized by Con-
gress and remains in force today.96 President Trump invoked the 
Act in 2018 to order electricity distributors to buy power from the 
coal industry, and certain private industry leaders have urged him 
to nationalize the country’s only rare earth minerals mine.97
The regularity of mid-20th century government takeovers of pri-
vate industry was likely the reason President Harry Truman was 
confident that his unilateral seizure of the nation’s steel mills 
would stand. But Truman’s action led to the Youngstown decision 
that sets limits on executive authority for seizures. In Youngstown,
even as the Supreme Court ruled that Truman overreached, they 
reaffirmed Congress’s power to pass legislation authorizing a Pres-
ident to conduct such seizures. Further, a majority of the justices 
affirmed that, even without congressional authorization, the Presi-
dent possesses powers to seize private property in a more severe 
emergency than the possible, but not yet occurring, steel shortage. 
The emergency seizure power will be discussed further in Part VI.
The Youngstown ruling did not deter the federal government 
from continuing a regular pattern of nationalizations throughout 
the rest of the 20th century and into the 21st, much of it through 
so-called “bailouts” of banks, automobile manufacturers, insurance 
companies, railroads, and airlines, culminating in the nationaliza-
tion of several of the nation’s largest companies during the eco-
nomic crisis of 2008.98 Like nationalizations during the world wars, 
most nationalizations during economic crises have been tempo-
rary, with control over the companies eventually returned to the 
original owners or new private interests.
95. Defense Production Act of 1950, 50 U.S.C. §§ 4501–4568 (2012).
96. See 15 C.F.R. §700.30; JARED T. BROWN, CONG. RESEARCH SERVS., R43767, THE 
DEFENSE PRODUCTION ACT OF 1950: HISTORY, AUTHORITIES, AND CONSIDERATIONS FOR 
CONGRESS 6 (2018).
97. Phillip Bump, Trump’s Plan To Use A Cold War-Era Law To Bolster The Coal Industry,
WASH. POST (June 1, 2018), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/politics/wp/2018
/06/01/trumps-plan-to-use-a-cold-war-era-law-to-bolster-the-coal-industry-explained/; Sally 
Bakewell & Steven Church, This CEO Wants Trump to Nationalize the Only Rare-Earth Mine in 
America, BLOOMBERG (July 18, 2017), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2017-07-
18/trump-urged-by-ceo-to-nationalize-the-only-u-s-rare-earths-mine. In response to the need 
to quickly produce medical equipment for the COVID-19 pandemic, President Trump in-
voked the Defense Production Act in March 2020. Charlie Savage, How the Defense Production
Act Could Yield More Masks, Ventilators and Tests, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 20, 2020),
https://www.nytimes.com/2020/03/20/us/politics/defense-production-act-virus.html.
98. See Nestor M. Davidson, Resetting the Baseline of Ownership: Takings and Investor Expec-
tations After the Bailouts, 75 MD. L. REV. 722, 722–23 (2016).
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But there were dissenting voices about the wisdom of returning 
control to private hands. After World War I, President Woodrow 
Wilson and some members of Congress argued that the railroads 
and radio networks were best suited to remain under federal own-
ership.99 The same theme was echoed a few decades later by con-
servative Chicago School of Economics professor Henry Simons, 
who called for the government to be prepared to take over and 
manage any industry where competition could not be ensured.100 
In 1969, one of the most influential economists of the mid-to-late 
20th century, John Kenneth Galbraith, argued that the entire de-
fense industry was being anti-competitive by nature and thus 
should be nationalized.101 Galbraith cited as rationale the lack of 
competition and the firms’ close relationship to the government as 
the purchaser of the firms’ products.102 Both characteristics run 
parallel to the pharmaceutical industry’s reliance on monopolies 
and government-funded research and bulk purchases.103 Further, 
Galbraith argued that greater efficiency and relief from the gov-
ernment spending distortions created by the lobbying activities of 
privately held defense firms could come from nationalization.104 In 
the 1960s and 1970s, some U.K. physicians and the prime minister 
echoed similar arguments while proposing that at least some of the 
pharmaceutical industry be nationalized.105 
There are three notable examples of the federal government 
executing a full and permanent nationalization. All supply lessons 
for the task of nationalizing the pharmaceutical industry. First, in 
1933, Congress passed and President Franklin Roosevelt signed in-
to law the Tennessee Valley Authority (TVA), creating a federal 
corporation to provide electricity, flood control, and agricultural 
and economic development to a struggling region.106 As with the 
pharmaceutical industry currently, there were private companies 
                                                   
 99. See HANNA, supra note 90, at 8. 
 100. See ALPEROVITZ, supra note 78, at 79. 
 101. See John Kenneth Galbraith, The Big Defense Firms Are Really Public Firms and Should be 
Nationalized, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 16, 1969, at SM50. 
 102. Id. 
 103. Id. 
 104. Id. 
 105. See Kieran O’Brien, Researchers Ask: Should the Pharmaceutical Industry be Nationalized?, 
ADVANCED SCI. NEWS (Mar. 5, 2020), https://www.advancedsciencenews.com/researchers-
ask-should-the-pharmaceutical-industry-be-nationalized. In a March, 2020 BMJ article, Mari-
ana Mazzucato and Henry Lishi Li argued that the pharmaceutical industry should be na-
tionalized. But they went on to state the case in favor of a public option for pharmaceutical 
manufacturing, and said they are not in favor of full government ownership of the sector. 
Mariana Mazzucato, Henry Lishi Li & Ara Darzi, Head to Head: Is It Time to Nationalise the 
Pharmaceutical Industry?, BRIT. MED. J., Mar. 4, 2020, at 1, https://doi.org/10.1136/
bmj.m769. 
 106. Tennessee Valley Authority Act, 16 U.S.C. §§ 831–831(dd) (2012). 
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already in the energy business in the TVA region when Congress 
and the President took action. Nineteen of those companies, led 
by the Tennessee Electric Power Company (TEPCO), the largest 
power company in the state, sued to block the TVA. 
But the U.S. Supreme Court in 1939 upheld the lower court’s 
dismissal of the companies’ claim.107 In an analysis that provides 
important guidance for the review of the pharmaceutical national-
ization steps outlined in this Article, the Court found that the TVA 
undoubtedly damaged the private companies’ business models, in-
cluding through its aggressive use of eminent domain powers. But 
the harm caused was “damnum absque injuria—a damage not con-
sequent upon the violation of any right recognized by law.”108 After 
the Court’s ruling, the TVA and other public energy corporations 
purchased TEPCO’s electric system for $78 million, and TEPCO 
shut down its energy business.109 
The TVA is a successful, enduring, and popular example of full 
nationalization. It is credited with helping lift impoverished areas 
out of the Great Depression and continues to provide electricity to 
ten million persons, with services and facilities paid for by custom-
ers and not government appropriation.110 TVA’s popularity as a 
public entity makes the occasional proposals to sell it to private in-
terests political non-starters. The most recent suggestion of selling 
off the TVA, floated in President Trump’s proposed budget in 
2018, was deemed “a looney idea” by Tennessee’s Republican Sen-
ator Lamar Alexander. “It has zero chance of becoming law,” he 
said.111 The TVA’s unapologetic use of government powers, includ-
ing eminent domain, to successfully subdue challenges by private 
competitors is valuable precedent for the nationalization steps out-
lined in Part VI. 
In 1970, another permanent nationalization occurred when 
Congress created the National Railroad Passenger Corporation, 
better known as Amtrak. As with the TVA, there were multiple pri-
vate companies in the same business when the legislation was 
passed. Amtrak is a quasi-public corporation, so those companies 
                                                   
 107. See Tennessee Elec. Power Co. v. Tennessee Val. Auth., 306 U.S. 118, 119 (1939). 
 108. Id. at 140. 
 109. See Tennessee Valley Authority 1933-1939, ENCYCLOPEDIA.COM, https://www 
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1933-1939 (last updated June 12, 2020). 
 110. See id. 
 111. Press Release, Lamar Alexander, U.S. Senator, Alexander: Proposal to Sell TVA 
Transmission Lines “a Looney Idea . . . with Zero Chance of Becoming Law” (Feb. 12, 2018), 
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with passenger rail service were invited to shutter their services and 
instead accept stock in Amtrak. Most did so.112
Finally, in the wake of the September 11, 2001 attacks, Congress 
passed and President George W. Bush signed into law legislation to 
nationalize airport security. The Aviation and Transportation Se-
curity Act directed that the Under Secretary of Transportation for 
Security assume all security and screening functions at United 
States airports.113 The legislation had a devastating impact on pri-
vate companies such as Huntleigh USA Corporation, which, at the 
time of the Act’s passage, had contracts with approximately seven-
ty-five airlines to cover passenger and baggage screening at thirty-
five airports across the United States.
Just like the private corporations harmed by the TVA, Huntleigh 
filed suit—and suffered the same fate. The U.S. Court of Appeals 
for the Federal Circuit rejected Huntleigh’s claim against the 
United States under the Fifth Amendment Takings Clause, ruling 
that the government “merely frustrated [Huntleigh’s] business in-
terests,” but did not take its property.114 The U.S. Supreme Court 
refused to hear Huntleigh’s appeal.115 The process that created the 
Transportation Security Administration demonstrated again the 
federal government’s clear power to quickly and comprehensively 
nationalize an industry when public safety and attendant political 
pressures are in play. It is also worth noting that the Transporta-
tion Security Administration nationalization, like that of Amtrak, 
occurred under the watch of a Republican president.
IV. FIFTH AMENDMENT TAKINGS LAW AND THE NATIONALIZATION 
OF THE PHARMACEUTICAL INDUSTRY: A FOUR-STEP PROCESS
As outlined above, the United States has a substantial history of 
nationalizing firms and even entire industries in times of national 
crisis when the dysfunctions of private-sector ownership pose a 
danger to the well-being of the nation. Furthermore, the harm 
caused by the private sector domination of the pharmaceutical 
manufacturing and distribution process has advanced far beyond 
prospective danger: the status quo is sickening and even killing 
Americans, while also condemning millions to physical and finan-
cial suffering.
112. See Amtrak Year-Year: 1970-1972, AMTRAK (May 9, 2012), https://history.
amtrak.com/blogs/blog/the-early-years.
113. 49 U.S.C. § 44901 (2012).
114. Huntleigh USA Corp. v. United States, 525 F.3d 1370, 1384 (Fed. Cir. 2008).
115. Huntleigh USA Corp. v. United States, 555 U.S. 1045 (2008).
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That suffering is in significant part inflicted by corporations ei-
ther fully headquartered in the United States or doing a consider-
able amount of business here. Measured by revenue, six of the top 
ten pharmaceutical companies are based in the United States.116 
The United States represents forty-five percent of the global phar-
maceutical market.117 The damage being inflicted domestically by 
these corporations can and must be relieved by the federal gov-
ernment using the legal tools of public seizure that have been rec-
ognized and implemented since the country’s birth. 
Not only is the seizure of private property by federal, state, and 
local governments squarely supported by the nation’s laws, those 
laws justify nationalization of the pharmaceutical industry at a cost 
far below the current value of pharmaceutical corporations. Under 
U.S. constitutional law, the federal government can provide quite 
limited compensation upon seizure, an important factor when na-
tionalizing an industry that globally collects revenue of more than 
a trillion dollars per year.118 
A four-step process for nationalizing the U.S. pharmaceutical 
industry, with limited compensation and in full compliance with 
U.S. law, would proceed as follows. 
A.  Step One: Congress Passes Legislation Creating and  
Empowering a U.S. Medicines Agency (USMA) 
As an initial action, Congress should pass legislation creating a 
U.S. Medicines Agency (USMA). The USMA should be given spe-
cific authority to manufacture and distribute medicines to the U.S. 
population, to issue compulsory licenses, and to seize private prop-
erty to fulfill the legislation’s broad purpose to make medicines 
widely available. Past similar legislation includes the Army Appro-
priations Act of 1916, the Smith-Connally Act/War Labor Disputes 
Act of 1943, and the Defense Production Act of 1950, the last of 
which remains in effect.119 
In the medicines context, similar but more narrow legislation 
was proposed as recently as 2018 and again in 2019, when Senator 
Elizabeth Warren and Representative Jan Schakowsky introduced 
the Affordable Drug Manufacturing Act, aimed at creating a new 
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federal Office of Drug Manufacturing with the power to manufac-
ture and distribute generic medicines, where the patents have ex-
pired, and any medicines still protected by patents but eligible for 
manufacture via compulsory licenses issued by the federal govern-
ment.120  
As another example, when the United States faced the potential 
of widespread infection from anthrax and a possible shortage of 
the antibiotic ciprofloxacin in 2001, then-Representative Sherrod 
Brown introduced the Public Health Emergency Medicines Act. 
The legislation would have empowered the Secretary of Health 
and Human Services to issue compulsory licenses for medicines pa-
tents needed to address public health emergencies. The legislation 
called for “reasonable remuneration” for the use of the patents, an 
amount to be determined in the context of factors including pub-
lic health needs, the invention’s reliance on publicly funded re-
search, and the need to address anti-competitive practices.121 
Article 31 of the TRIPS Agreement preserves the rights of party 
nations to use “a patent without the authorization of the right 
holder, including use by the government or third parties author-
ized by the government,” with “adequate remuneration” paid to 
the patent-holder.122 The TRIPS language creates far broader space 
for compulsory licensing legislation than the United States has ever 
exercised. As discussed below, existing compulsory licensing rights 
under the Bayh-Dole Act of 1980 and 28 U.S.C. § 1498 provide a 
platform for significant executive branch action to increase access 
to affordable medicines. But as explained below, those statutes 
have limits on their applicability. Therefore, Congress in its USMA-
establishing legislation should enact a comprehensive medicines-
focused compulsory licensing rule. Such a rule would be similar to 
the 2001 Public Health Emergency Medicines Act and to many of 
the rules adopted in the medicines context by other TRIPS signa-
tory nations.123  
                                                   
 120. Affordable Drug Manufacturing Act, S. 3775, 115th Cong. (2018); Press Release, 
Elizabeth Warren, U.S. Senator, Schakowsky, Warren Reintroduce Affordable Drug Manu-
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SUMMER 2020] Tell Me How It Ends 781 
 
Privately held patents operate as the chief barrier to accessing 
essential medicines in the United States. But there are other po-
tential barriers to the USMA’s ability to deploy needed resources 
and manufacturing techniques for producing medicines, especially 
biologic medicines. The USMA legislation will need to explicitly 
prevent the use of data and marketing exclusivities to bar the gov-
ernment from accessing the technology necessary to produce med-
icines.124 Potential trade secret and confidentiality agreement bar-
riers should be acknowledged and removed as well. Again, it is 
important to emphasize that such barriers are government-created 
and can therefore be just as readily dismantled by government ac-
tion, as the TRIPS Agreement acknowledges.125 There are already 
calls for the reduction or elimination of data and market exclusivi-
ty in the medicines context, along with significant recognition of 
the need for a public health or public interest exception to trade 
secrets protections.126 
The path to pharmaceutical industry nationalization mapped 
out here contemplates the executive branch taking action based 
on explicit congressional approval for all steps. Indeed, some of 
the actions called for in Step Two are already statutorily author-
ized. The Supreme Court in Hawaii Housing Authority v. Midkiff, 
applying reasoning later affirmed in the 2005 decision of Kelo v. 
City of New London, additionally made it clear that congressional de-
terminations regarding whether takings are justified will rarely be 
questioned by courts. “Judicial deference is required because, in 
our system of government, legislatures are better able to assess 
what public purposes should be advanced by an exercise of the tak-
ing power. . . . Thus, if a legislature, state or federal, determines 
                                                   
renz, MAKE MEDICINES AFFORDABLE (Oct. 2, 2017), http://makemedicinesaffordable.org/
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there are substantial reasons for an exercise of the taking power, 
courts must defer to its determination that the taking will serve a 
public use.”127 
It is also important to note that, given the national emergency at 
hand, a lack of explicit congressional approval does not rob the 
President of the power to act on her own while Congress proceeds 
with its deliberations over an eventual course of action. Over the 
years, U.S. presidents have conducted dozens of seizures without 
explicit congressional approval, including President Lincoln seiz-
ing rail and telegraph lines, President Wilson seizing coal mines, 
and President Franklin Roosevelt seizing an aviation plant.128 
Even when a President’s seizure was blocked by the Supreme 
Court in Youngstown, a review of the Court’s decision affirms that 
emergency executive action in response to the medicines crisis is 
permissible.129 President Harry Truman, responding to a threat-
ened strike that had the potential to interrupt the production of 
steel needed to support the ongoing Korean War effort, ordered 
his Secretary of Commerce to seize and operate most of the coun-
try’s steel mills.130 In the preceding years, Truman had seized doz-
ens of plants and industries with similar justifications.131 
In Youngstown, however, a majority of the justices held that the 
President, by acting without congressional approval, had over-
stepped his bounds. Yet the court’s majority was careful not to 
handcuff a future President who might need to act unilaterally in a 
time of crisis. Seven of the nine justices declined to hold that the 
President could not execute a similar seizure on her own in more 
dire circumstances or when Congress had absented itself from the 
process.132 
Those seven included Chief Justice Fred Vinson, who in his dis-
sent recited multiple instances of Presidents taking bold action on 
their own, including property seizures, in times of emergency. 
“Presidents have taken prompt action to enforce the laws and pro-
tect the country whether or not Congress happened to provide in 
advance for the particular method of execution,” he wrote.  
 
 [T]he fact that Congress and the courts have consistently 
recognized and given their support to such executive ac-
tion indicates that such a power of seizure has been accept-
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ed throughout our history. History bears out the genius of 
the Founding Fathers, who created a Government subject 
to law but not left subject to inertia when vigor and initia-
tive are required.133 
 
Justice Robert Jackson’s concurring opinion advanced a since 
oft-cited framework for evaluating the limits of presidential author-
ity to act on her own. Justice Jackson wrote,  
 
there is a zone of twilight in which [the President] and 
Congress may have concurrent authority, or in which its 
distribution is uncertain. Therefore, congressional inertia, 
indifference or quiescence may sometimes, at least as a 
practical matter, enable, if not invite, measures on inde-
pendent presidential responsibility. In this area, any actual 
test of power is likely to depend on the imperatives of 
events and contemporary imponderables rather than on 
abstract theories of law.134 
 
Thus, the majority of justices in Youngstown preserved important 
options for the President to confront the current medicines crisis. 
With Americans suffering and dying daily because of the crisis cre-
ated by private ownership of the pharmaceutical process, Justice 
Jackson’s contemplated “imperative of events” is surely in play, at 
least until Congress takes the necessary steps to create a U.S. Medi-
cines Agency. 
B.  Step Two: The Executive Branch Exercises Powers to Issue Compulsory 
Licenses for the USMA to Manufacture Patented Medicines 
Congress has already provided the executive branch with signifi-
cant powers to address the current medicines crisis. Specifically, 
the U.S. Code in two notable instances preserves for the federal 
government the right to issue compulsory licenses. 
The best-known of these legislative platforms for compulsory li-
censes was created by the Bayh-Dole Act of 1980.135 As discussed 
above, Bayh-Dole unwisely enables the surrender of the patent 
rights to government-discovered inventions to private corpora-
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tions. But when passing the legislation, Congress supplied an es-
cape hatch. Responding to significant criticism of what was called a 
multi-billion dollar giveaway, Congress via Bayh-Dole provided the 
executive branch with the right to “march in” and issue a compul-
sory license for a federally-funded discovery.136
March-in rights are triggered when the invention is not available 
to the public on “reasonable terms” from the patent holder or if a 
health or safety need arises.137 Those rights are limited to medi-
cines discovered with U.S. government funding. Although that cat-
egory encompasses a wide scope of initial patents, as discussed in 
Part II, it may not include technology protected by secondary pa-
tents that corporations obtain after the initial rights transfer from 
the government.138
However, there are no such federal-funding-source limitations in 
28 U.S.C § 1498’s compulsory licensing provision.139 In legislation 
that the U.S. Court of Federal Claims analogized to eminent do-
main powers, the statute provides a straightforward grant of rights 
to the federal government to use or manufacture patent-protected 
goods for use “by and for” the government, with only the obliga-
tion to provide “reasonable and entire compensation” to the pa-
tent-holder.140 The statute first adopted in 1910 was amended in 
1942, and the legislative history of those amendments makes it 
clear that Congress granted the government this patent-bypass 
right in part to address potential price-gouging by patent-
holders.141
Although the existing U.S. compulsory licensing rights are un-
derused in the medicines context, they are not mere theoretical 
tools. The United States has been a global leader in issuing com-
pulsory licenses to restore competition to a monopolized market.142
Compulsory licenses have been issued for medical technologies in-
cluding stem cells, laser eye surgery, gene therapy, and ultrasound 
136. 126 Cong. Rec. 29,898 (1980) (statement of Rep. Brown) (“I am aware of the con-
cern that granting contractors exclusive rights to federally funded inventions is a ‘give-away’
of the taxpayers’ property.”); Hearings on S. 1215 Before the Subcomm. on Sci., Tech., & Space of 
the S. Comm. On Commerce, Sci., & Transp., 96th Cong. 400 (1979) (statement of Rep. Brown).
137. 35 U.S.C. §§ 200–212 (2012).
138. Id.
139. 28 U.S.C. § 1498 (2012).
140. Decca Ltd. v. United States, 640 F.2d 1156, 1167 (Ct. Cl. 1980).
141. Brennan et al., supra note 54, at 300–01.
142. JAMES LOVE, U.N. DEVELOPMENT PROGRAMME & WHO, REMUNERATION GUIDELINES 
FOR NON-VOLUNTARY USE OF A PATENT ON MEDICAL TECHNOLOGIES 15 (2005), 
https://www.undp.org/content/dam/aplaws/publication/en/publications/hiv-aids/access-
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SUMMER 2020] Tell Me How It Ends 785 
 
imaging catheters.143 In the period between 2006 and 2011 alone, 
U.S. courts issued six different compulsory licenses for medical 
technologies.144 Beyond the health context, the United States has 
also issued compulsory licenses for advances in energy technology, 
methods to reduce air pollution, truck parts, plastics, personal 
computers, corn seeds, microprocessors, animal vaccines, and gas-
oline.145 
When compulsory licenses are issued, the compensation to pa-
tent-holders has typically been set at ten percent or less of total 
sales of the items manufactured by the licensees, and courts have 
routinely rejected the idea of compensating the patent-holder for 
lost profits.146 Importantly, when licenses have been issued to rem-
edy anti-competitive practices, royalties are usually quite low and 
often denied altogether, an approach protected by the terms of the 
TRIPS Agreement.147 
When it comes to the medicines context, the U.S. Department 
of Defense’s Military Medical Supply Agency during the 1950s and 
1960s relied on § 1498 to procure dozens of drugs from non-
licensed manufacturers, despite U.S. corporations holding patents 
on those medicines.148 In 1994, the United States issued a compul-
sory license for the irritable bowel syndrome drug dicyclomine.149 
In recent decades, the U.S. has twice threatened patent-holders 
with compulsory licensing in order to reduce the price of 
HIV/AIDS medicines.150 In 2001, the George W. Bush administra-
tion threatened Bayer, whose antibiotic ciprofloxacin was the only 
approved oral treatment for anthrax, with a compulsory license. In 
response, Bayer cut the drug’s price in half and pledged a huge in-
crease in production.151 
                                                   
 143. James Love, KEI Research Note: Recent United States Compulsory Licenses, 2014:1 
KNOWLEDGE ECOLOGY INT’L 6 (Mar. 7, 2014), http://keionline.org/sites/default/files/
Annex_A_US_Compulsory_Licenses_7Mar2014_8_5x11.pdf. 
 144. James Love, Open Letter to Those Who Collectively Produced the May 23, 2012 Statement to 
the WIPO SCP on the Topics of Patents and Health, KNOWLEDGE ECOLOGY INT’L (May 25, 2012), 
https://www.keionline.org/21854. 
 145. Love, supra note 143. 
 146. Amy Kapczynski & Aaron Kesselheim, Government Patent Use: A Legal Approach To 
Reducing Drug Spending,  35 HEALTH AFF. 791, 793 (2016); Brennan et al., supra note 54,  
at 311. 
 147. TRIPS Agreement, supra note 59, at art. 40; LOVE, supra note 142, at 12. 
 148. Brennan et al., supra note 54, at 305. 
 149. The Dow Chemical Company et al., 59 Fed. Reg. 34,625, 34,626–27 (F.T.C. 1994) 
(proposed consent agreement). 
 150. Jennifer Penman & Fran Quigley, Better Late Than Never: How the U.S. Government 
Can and Should Use Bayh-Dole March-In Rights to Respond to the Medicines Access Crisis, 54 
WILLAMETTE L. REV. 71, 188 (2017). 
 151. Keith Bradsher & Edmund Andrews, A Nation Challenged: U.S. Says Bayer Will Cut 
Cost of Its Anthrax Drug, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 24, 2011), http://www.nytimes.com/2001/10/24/
business/a-nation-challenged-cipro-us-says-bayer-will-cut-cost-of-its-anthrax-drug.html. 
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In Step Two, the U.S. government should immediately and 
thoroughly exercise its existing compulsory licensing rights to cre-
ate a supply of low-cost medicines.152 Some urgently needed medi-
cines would include insulin and asthma inhalers. Both are in high 
demand, with well-documented barriers to access due to private 
pharmaceutical company pricing.153
This is not the first call for broader use of Bayh-Dole march-in 
rights and § 1498 for medicines access.154 Indeed, some might ar-
gue that more robust exercise of existing compulsory licensing 
rights will be a sufficient response to the current medicines crisis. 
But the federal government response to the medicines crisis can-
not stop at Step Two, no matter how broadly conducted. The best 
argument for pressing forward is revealed in the contrast between 
the clear remedies for responding to a medicines pricing crisis via 
march-in rights and § 1498 and the government’s overall unwill-
ingness to avail itself of these remedies.155
Consider that in the thirty-nine-year history of the Bayh-Dole 
Act, the federal government has not once exercised the march-in 
rights created by the legislation.156 Democrat and Republican ad-
152. In 1983, Congress passed the U.S. Orphan Drug Act, an effort to spur research for 
diseases that affect a small number of people, or otherwise do not suggest a lucrative U.S. 
market for private corporations. The law provides those corporations an early-stage push, in 
the form of research grants and increased tax credits, along with a late-stage pull from gov-
ernment-granted market exclusivity for the resulting drugs. ORPHANET, About Orphan Drugs
(2015), http://www.orpha.net/national/AU-EN/index/about-orphan-drugs. Since nation-
alizing the pharmaceutical industry removes the distorting profit motive from research pri-
oritization, the U.S. Medicines Agency would be able to focus on developing and making 
available medicines such as “orphan drugs” without concern over profitability.
153. Fran Quigley, Opinion, This Free Clinic Is a Study in the US Healthcare Struggle, NAT’L
CATHOLIC REP. (July 2, 2019), https://www.ncronline.org/news/opinion/free-clinic-study-
us-healthcare-struggle.
154. Penman & Quigley, supra note 150, at 213; Kapczynski & Kesselheim, supra note 
146, at 794.
155. The pharmaceutical industry has not only been able to block implementation of 
the pro-patient terms in the Bayh-Dole Act, it has taken the similarly pro-patient intentions 
of the 1983 Orphan Drug Act and leveraged many of the incentives created by the legisla-
tion to support development of medicines that turn out to be enormously profitable to cor-
porations. Sarah Jane Tribble & Sidney Lupkin, Government Investigation Finds Flaws in the 
FDA’s Orphan Drug Program, KAISER HEALTH NEWS (Nov. 30, 2018), https://khn.org/news/
government-investigation-finds-flaws-in-the-fdas-orphan-drug-program. A high-profile exam-
ple of the for-profit gaming of the orphan drug system occurred in the early days of the 
COVID-19 pandemic. Gilead Sciences requested from the Food and Drug Administration 
orphan drug status for potential coronavirus treatment remdesivir. Gilead’s request was an 
apparent effort to get the benefits of orphan drug designation before official confirmation 
that one of the most widespread diseases in history was far from a “rare disease.” Under 
pressure from advocates, Gilead withdrew the request. Sidney Lupkin, Gilead Declines ‘Rare 
Disease’ Status For Experimental Coronavirus Drug, NPR (Mar. 25, 2020), https://www.npr.org/
sections/health-shots/2020/03/25/821534016/drugmaker-asks-fda-to-rescind-rare-disease-
status-perks-for-covid-19-drug.
156. Ryan Whalen, The Bayh-Dole Act & Public Rights in Federally Funded Inventions: Will the 
Agencies Ever Go Marching In?, 109 NW. U. L. REV. 1083, 1083 (2015). The industry has also 
managed to rebound from the setbacks from the massive global advocacy that led to the 
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ministrations alike, at times urged on by former senators-turned-
drug-industry-lobbyists, have stretched the boundaries of credulity 
by concluding that the law’s requirement to make medicines avail-
able on “reasonable terms” does not refer to affordability.157 Thus, 
even the current deadly pricing crisis has not led to a single march-
in action, despite an extensive legislative history showing that af-
fordability was precisely what Congress had in mind when preserv-
ing the government’s rights to bypass the patents via compulsory 
licensing.158 The explanation for this remarkable breach of duty is 
clear: the pharmaceutical industry has succeeded in a multi-decade 
process of regulatory capture. The industry’s success is thanks to its 
generous campaign contributions, lobbying expenditures, and the 
revolving door between pharmaceutical management, federal 
agency leadership, and even congressional leadership.159 
With widespread issuances of compulsory licenses in Step Two, 
the executive branch could finally reverse this shameful legacy. But 
                                                   
dramatic reduction in prices for antiretroviral medicines to treat HIV/AIDS and the U.S.-
focused pushback against ciprofloxacin costs in the face of a potential anthrax crisis. The 
reduction in the costs of one set of medicines has not prevented overall costs from consist-
ently climbing. SMITH & SIPLON, supra note 63; Bradsher & Andrews, supra note 151. Beyond 
the pharmaceutical context, there is a quite recent example of the danger that exists when 
an industry is left intact with enormous resources and an existential motive to thwart the 
reform intended by legislation. Despite the fact that the 2010 Dodd-Frank Wall Street Re-
form and Consumer Protection Act was considered to be the most sweeping banking regula-
tory legislation since the 1930s, the financial industry has been able to block much of its 
most impactful intentions from taking effect. Gary Rivlin, How Wall Street Defanged Dodd-
Frank, THE NATION (Apr. 30, 2013), https://www.thenation.com/article/archive/how-wall-
street-defanged-dodd-frank (“The same financial behemoths that had fought so ferociously 
to block Dodd-Frank were not going to let the mere fact of the bill’s passage ruin their 
plans. ‘Halftime,’ shrugged Scott Talbott, chief lobbyist for the Financial Services 
Roundtable, a lobbying group representing one hundred of the country’s largest financial 
institutions. . . . Whereas commercial banks such as Wells Fargo, Citigroup and JPMorgan 
Chase, along with their trade groups, spent $55 million lobbying in 2010 (the year Dodd-
Frank became law), they would collectively spend $61 million in 2011 and again in 2012, 
according to OpenSecrets.org. ”). Further examples of regulated-but-not-nationalized indus-
tries regrouping as once-again exploitative entities include the government antitrust efforts 
to break up manipulative monopolies that were successful in the short term but saw the cor-
porations eventually reconsolidate. ALPEROVITZ, supra note 78, at 77–79. 
 157. Francis S. Collins, Letter from Francis Collins to Andrew Goldman, NAT’L INSTS. HEALTH, 
(June 20, 2016), https://www.keionline.org/sites/default/files/Final-Response-Goldman-
6.20.2016.pdf; Birch Bayh & Bob Dole, Our Law Helps Patients Get New Drugs Sooner,  
WASH. POST (Apr. 11, 2002), https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/opinions/2002/04 
/11/our-law-helps-patients-get-new-drugs-sooner/d814d22a-6e63-4f06-8da3-d9698 
552fa24/?utm_term=.c5ffebd548d2; Alicia Mundy, Just the Medicine, WASH. MONTHLY,  
(Nov./Dec. 2016), https://washingtonmonthly.com/magazine/novemberdecember-2016/
just-the-medicine. 
 158. Penman & Quigley, supra note 150, at 187–88. 
 159. OPENSECRETS.ORG, CTR. FOR RESPONSIVE POL., Industries (2019), https://www 
.opensecrets.org/federal-lobbying/industries?cycle=2019; Sheila Kaplan, From FDA Expert to 
Biotech Insider: The Drug Industry Thrives on the Revolving Door, STAT (Sept. 27, 2016), 
https://www.statnews.com/2016/09/27/fda-biopharama-revolving-door-study; David Kirk-
patrick & Duff Wilson, One Grand Deal Too Many Costs Lobbyist His Job, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 12, 
2010), https://www.nytimes.com/2010/02/13/health/policy/13pharm.html. 
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the issuance of compulsory licenses is not a full taking, as it does 
not extinguish the rights of patent-holders to continue to produce 
and sell their medicines. When critical medicines patents continue 
to be held by private corporations, even vigorous licensing of those 
medicines to others cannot prevent the re-capture of the system by 
those politically powerful patent-holders. Therefore, outright sei-
zures will be necessary to prevent backsliding into another profi-
teering-caused medicines crisis. 
C.  Step Three: The USMA Executes Seizures that Are Exempt from the Fifth 
Amendment’s Compensation Requirement 
As noted above, the Fifth Amendment’s dual protection of gov-
ernment seizure rights and compensation has governed centuries 
of eminent domain practices. As courts have interpreted the Tak-
ings Clause in the context of specific disputes, two principles have 
emerged with particular application to the task of nationalizing the 
pharmaceutical sector. 
First, in determining whether a Fifth Amendment taking has oc-
curred, the Supreme Court in Pennsylvania Central Transportation 
Co. v. New York City developed a framework for considering the 
government’s level of interference with reasonable “distinct in-
vestment-based expectations.”160 The more the private property 
owner reasonably anticipated that she would enjoy unencumbered 
rights, the greater the obligation of the government to compensate 
for interfering with them. This holds true even if the governmental 
interference is only by regulation that severely limits the owner’s 
use of property—a so-called regulatory taking. 
Second, although the long history of government takings in the 
United States has been dominated by the seizure or regulation of 
real property (i.e. land and attached buildings), the Supreme 
Court in Horne v. Department of Agriculture made clear that it con-
siders some government seizures of personal property—in that 
case, a portion of a California farmer’s raisin crop—to also be sub-
ject to the limits of the Takings Clause.161 
Given these two principles, it is difficult to envision the U.S. gov-
ernment being able to execute a full seizure of all pharmaceutical 
industry assets without triggering a constitutional obligation to 
provide some level of reimbursement in the spirit of “just compen-
sation.” A broad government takeover of medicines development, 
                                                   
 160. Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104, 124 (1978). 
 161. Horne v. Dep’t of Agric., 576 U.S. 350, 360-61 (2015). 
SUMMER 2020] Tell Me How It Ends 789 
 
manufacturing, and distribution would undoubtedly be achieved 
more quickly and efficiently via federalization of pharmaceutical 
corporations’ plants and key personnel, as was the case in multiple 
past U.S. corporate seizures. What should be the amount of com-
pensation for such seizures? 
The broad rule in government seizure cases is that the dispos-
sessed owner should be compensated for the “highest and best 
use” of their property. U.S. courts have interpreted the highest and 
best use standard to mean “[t]he reasonably probable and legal 
use of [property], which is physically possible, appropriately sup-
ported, financially feasible, and that results in the highest value.”162 
But here, the argument is that the amount of compensation due 
to pharmaceutical corporations upon seizure is much more limited 
than the baseline amount of highest and best use would suggest. 
Fifth Amendment takings law provides strong arguments in sup-
port of “just compensation” upon nationalization being far below 
any current value estimation for the corporations that make up 
that industry. Those value estimates are dependent on govern-
ment-granted patents, heavy government subsidies, and wide-
spread malfeasance that has boosted profits at the expense of the 
public welfare. All of those factors support the nationalization of 
the industry at a cost far less than its present value. 
1.  Patents Are Not Property in Fifth Amendment Takings Context. 
When executing the seizure of private pharmaceutical company 
assets, the U.S. government’s compensation obligations are signifi-
cantly reduced if we accept that corporate-held drug patents are 
not “property” in the context of the Fifth Amendment Takings 
Clause. This is a conclusion with immense impact, since the value 
of patents represents the lion’s share of the assets of pharmaceuti-
cal companies. For example, the corporation AbbVie in 2018 re-
lied on a single patent-protected medicine, Humira, for nearly $20 
billion of its revenue, fifty-eight percent of the company’s total.163 
For Celgene and Bristol-Meyers Squibb, two patent-protected drugs 
                                                   
 162. Brace v. United States, 72 Fed. Cl. 337, 350 (2006) (quoting Loveladies Harbor, Inc. 
v. United States, 21 Cl. Ct. 153, 156 (1990)). 
 163. AbbVie Reports Full-Year and Fourth-Quarter 2018 Financial Results, ABBVIE  
(Jan. 25, 2019), https://news.abbvie.com/news/abbvie-reports-full-year-and-fourth-quarter-
2018-financial-results.htm. 
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accounted for more than sixty percent of their revenue in that 
same year.164 
This reliance on patent protection is not an anomaly. A few 
years earlier, a dozen of the companies that produced the twenty-
five best selling drugs in the world were each found to be collect-
ing more than ten percent of their revenue from just a single pa-
tent-protected medicine.165 In 2015, Gilead Science’s $32 billion 
revenue stream topped the Barron’s rankings of the 500 largest 
public companies.166 But that world-leading revenue came almost 
solely from a single group of closely-related patent-protected medi-
cines used to treat Hepatitis C.167 
The enormous monopoly-provided boost from patents allows 
corporations to charge as much as one thousand times their manu-
facturing costs.168 Without that boost, their revenue collapses. 
When patents expire and competitors enter the market to sell the 
drugs at prices as low as ten percent of the monopoly price, phar-
maceutical companies’ value can tumble off what is known as the 
“patent cliff.” The pharmaceutical industry lives in constant fear of 
that cliff.169 Industry analysts report that between 2018 and 2024, 
patent expirations in the prescription drug industry are expected 
to put up to $251 billion in sales at risk.170 
These patent monopolies are a government creation. As noted 
above, they are also a recent one. Late into the 20th century, doz-
ens of countries still refused to grant patents on essential medi-
cines. Even today the U.N. Commissioner on Human Rights takes 
pains to emphasize the primacy of human rights obligations over 
                                                   
 164. Naomi Kresge & John Lauerman, Big Pharma Faces The Curse Of The Billion-Dollar 
Blockbuster, BLOOMBERG (Jan. 11, 2019), https ://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2019-
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 170. Samantha DiGrande, Second Patent Cliff Lies Ahead for Pharma with $251 Billion in 
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the discretionary economic policies that can create intellectual 
property such as patents.171 
U.S. courts have also recognized the ephemeral, dependent na-
ture of patents, holding in two prominent cases that they do not 
meet the definition of property under the Fifth Amendment’s Tak-
ings Clause.172 Under U.S. law, the federal government may not be 
sued for actions like patent infringement unless it has waived its 
immunity, as it has via statutes such as the Federal Tort Claims 
Act.173 The U.S. Supreme Court, in Schillinger v. United States, and 
the Federal Circuit Court, in Zoltek Corp. v. United States, both held 
that the constitution does not include any waiver of the federal 
government’s rights to sovereign immunity from liability for in-
fringement of patent rights. Both courts flatly rejected claims for a 
Fifth Amendment Takings Clause “just compensation” remedy for 
government infringement on a privately held patent.174 
However, the Supreme Court in 2015, in the aforementioned 
raisins seizure case of Horne v. Department of Agriculture, created 
some confusion on the question of whether patents are property 
under the Takings Clause.175 The Horne Court repeated the lan-
guage of an 1882 decision, James v. Campbell, stating that patent-
holders do possess the entitlement to just compensation for gov-
ernment appropriation.176 Pointing to the Horne and James lan-
guage, some legal academics have since argued that patents should 
be considered property under the Takings Clause.177 
Despite that claim, the argument in support of patents being 
considered takings-applicable property is unsupported by the most 
relevant sources of law.178 Neither the Court in Horne nor in James 
actually ruled on patent questions, making their pronouncements 
dicta on this issue. By contrast, the Schillinger Court did rule on the 
patent takings question, rejecting the idea of patents as takings 
property. And the Schillinger Court addressed the question a dozen 
                                                   
 171. U.N. OHCHR, Sub-Comm’n on the Promotion & Prot. of Human Rights, 53d Sess., 
25th mtg. at 2, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/RES/2000/7 (Aug. 17, 2000). 
 172. Schillinger v. United States, 155 U.S. 163 (1894); Zoltek Corp. v. United States, 442 
F.3d 1345, 1351 (Fed. Cir. 2006), vacated on reh’g en banc, 672 F.3d 1309 (Fed. Cir. 2012). 
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of just compensation for government seizure—has been held to apply to a wider definition 
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ment takes them away. Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970). 
 174. Schillinger, 155 U.S. at 172; Zoltek Corp., 442 F.3d at 1351. 
 175. Horne v. Dep’t. of Agric., 576 U.S. 350, 359-360 (2015). 
 176. Id. (quoting James v. Campbell, 104 U.S. 356, 358 (1881)). 
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years after James, making it the Supreme Court’s most recent case 
on the issue.179
Schillinger was decided in 1894, but it holds up to modern stand-
ards. As mentioned above, Fifth Amendment Takings Clause juris-
prudence places great emphasis on how the government taking 
may interfere with the impacted party’s reasonable “investment-
backed expectations” of uninterrupted, unencumbered owner-
ship.180 In the 1992 case Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, the 
Supreme Court made it clear those expectations are limited in in-
stances where the government exercises a “traditionally high de-
gree of control,” to the extent that “new regulation might even 
render his property economically worthless.”181 The application in 
the medicines context is clear. There is no U.S. corporation hold-
ing a patent on a medicine that has not known from day one that 
the granting of a patent is a discretionary government action. They 
know, or should know, that the federal government retains rights 
under the Bayh-Dole Act and § 1498, as well as sweeping compul-
sory licensing powers protected by the TRIPS Agreement, to im-
mediately and summarily access any patented invention or tech-
nology.
Section 1498 provides a statutory path for the patent-holder to 
receive compensation for government use. But its existence and 
legislative history further support the conclusion that patents are 
not Fifth Amendment takings property. In 2012, the Federal Cir-
cuit Court in Zoltek noted that § 1498 was originally passed as the 
Patent Act of 1910, sixteen years after the Schillinger court held that 
there was no constitutional requirement for just compensation for 
government patent infringement.182 Section 1498, the Zoltek court 
noted, was Congress’s effort to provide a remedy to patent-holders 
via statute where one did not exist by virtue of the constitution.183
Congress’s decision after Schillinger to waive federal government 
immunity from those claims further undermines any argument 
that there is a constitutional guarantee to such compensation. The 
Supreme Court refused to hear the patent-holder’s appeal from 
Zoltek.
Assuming § 1498 remains in its current iteration at the time of 
nationalization of the pharmaceutical industry, the United States 
would be subject to that statutory obligation to provide “reasonable 
179. Schillinger, 155 U.S. at 172; see also Christy, Inc. v. United States, 141 Fed. Cl. 641, 
658 (2019) (holding that patents are not considered property for Takings Clause purposes);
180. Penn. Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104, 124 (2018).
181. Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1027–28 (1992).
182. Zoltek v. United States, 672 F.3d 1309, 1315 (Fed. Cir. 2012).
183. Id.
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and entire compensation” to the patent-holder for use of the pa-
tent. Of course, that is a congressionally-granted remedy to the pa-
tent-holder, and Congress could amend § 1498 to exempt pharma-
ceutical patent infringements from that waiver of sovereign 
immunity. That congressional action could even be added to Step 
One contemplated here. Even if § 1498 remains undisturbed, how-
ever, the compensation level under the statute has traditionally 
been set far below the windfall gains currently realized by the pa-
tent-possessing private pharmaceutical companies.
The most current and applicable law holds that patent seizures 
do not trigger the “just compensation” obligation under the Fifth 
Amendment. The statutory remedy of compensation exists alone 
and can be removed by Congress. The government can and should 
seize medicines patents in Step Three and can do so without a con-
stitutional obligation to compensate.
2. Most of the Value of Pharmaceutical Corporations Comes From 
Discretionary Government Actions—Including Early and Late-
stage Research, Patent Licensure, Tax Breaks, and Government 
Purchases—and the Government Should not be Required to 
Compensate for that Lost Value Upon Seizure.
Although the windfall profits from the current U.S. pharmaceu-
tical system flow into private hands, those profits and the assets that 
generate them are largely the products of discretionary govern-
ment action. This phenomenon is best illustrated by a simple walk-
through of the pharmaceutical process, from the laboratory to a 
patient’s medicine cabinet.
As noted above, the early-stage research that forms the most 
risky and lengthy segment of the medicines development process is 
funded almost entirely by government resources.184 For the 210 
new medicines approved by the FDA from 2010 to 2016, every one 
traces its origins back to government-funded research.185 Next, the 
Bayh-Dole Act prods the government to award to private entities 
the monopoly patents that create most of the financial value of 
these medicines.186 When those private companies conduct follow-
up research and market their eventual product, the government 
184. FRAN QUIGLEY, PRESCRIPTION FOR THE PEOPLE: AN ACTIVIST’S GUIDE TO MAKING 
MEDICINE AFFORDABLE FOR ALL 87–91 (2017).
185. Ekaterina G. Cleary et al., Contribution Of NIH Funding To New Drug Approvals 2010–
2016, 115 PNAS 2329 (2018), https://www.pnas.org/content/115/10/2329.
186. 35 U.S.C. §§ 200–12 (2012).
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allows them to deduct those costs from their tax obligations. And 
much of the late-stage research is federally funded as well.187 
Finally, federal and state governments step in to become the in-
dustry’s number one customer for the medicines produced.188 The 
prices they pay are artificially enhanced not just by government-
granted patents, but also by the congressional decision in 2003 to 
prevent the Medicare system from using its substantial purchasing 
power to negotiate down the cost of the medicines it buys.189 That 
no-negotiations promise costs the U.S. government as much as $49 
billion each year.190 
The government-dependent nature of the pharmaceutical in-
dustry business model has alarmed politically conservative advo-
cates who typically support private industry. In 2018, Cato Institute 
scholars and law professors, Charles Silver and David Hyman, 
wrote in favor of eliminating the patent system for medicines. 
“Some conservatives defend this system on free-market grounds, 
arguing that any measure that reduces drug company profits will 
necessarily reduce innovation,” they wrote. “But we are firm believ-
ers in the free market, and we think the system is a mess. It is de-
formed by monopolies and by misguided incentives tied to the 
payment system.”191 
The year before, conservative activist Mytheos Holt wrote in the 
American Spectator that “high drug prices are a result of specific 
government policy: something that decisively argues against the 
notion that the market for drugs is in any way free.” Holt wrote 
that drug companies were benefitting from a “corporate welfare-
driven pricing regime,” and that legislation aimed at limiting pa-
tent-holders’ ability to ward off generic alternatives was performing 
an important service by “smoking out the anticonservative nature 
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of an industry that conservatives have been willing to accept uncrit-
ically as an ally for far too long.”192 
Beyond creating fissures in the free-market political support sys-
tem that drug corporations have traditionally relied upon, the gov-
ernment-dependent nature of the pharmaceutical industry carries 
significance when determining just compensation for seizures. 
Common sense suggests that the seizing government should not be 
required to compensate private companies for any value that exists 
because of the government’s own actions. The Supreme Court 
agrees. 
In the 1973 case United States v. Fuller, the Court held that Arizo-
na ranchers were not entitled to Fifth Amendment takings com-
pensation for the value of their seized land created by government 
permits for livestock grazing on adjacent federal lands.193 The 
Court reviewed multiple cases holding that constitutionally-
mandated just compensation does not include value created by 
government action, including when value was increased by antici-
pated government wartime boat purchases or planned government 
development on seized land. The Fuller Court wrote  that “[t]hese 
cases go far toward establishing the general principle that the Gov-
ernment as condemnor may not be required to compensate a  
condemnee for elements of value that the Government has  
created . . . .”194 
The logic of this principle was recently explained by the con-
servative legal scholar and property rights activist Roger Pilon, writ-
ing for the Cato Institute where he serves as chair of constitutional 
studies: 
[W]hen government actions incidentally reduce property 
values, but no rights are violated because nothing that be-
longs free and clear to the owner is taken, no compensa-
tion is due. If the government closes a military base or a 
neighborhood school, for example, or builds a new high-
way distant from the old one with its commercial enterpris-
es, property values may decline as a result—but nothing was 
taken. We own our property and all the legitimate uses that 
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go with it, not the value in our property, which is a function 
of many ever-changing factors.195 
The path to nationalization here includes the exercise of com-
pulsory licensing power for pharmaceutical patents. Undoubtedly, 
that action will significantly reduce the government-created value 
currently enjoyed by pharmaceutical corporations. But those cor-
porations have no right to that value, and it should be excluded 
from the calculation of what equals “just compensation” for sei-
zure. As the Supreme Court stated in Pennsylvania Coal v. Mahon, 
“government hardly could go on if to some extent values incident 
to property could not be diminished without paying for every such 
change in the general law. As long recognized, some values are en-
joyed under an implied limitation and must yield to the police 
power.”196 The value possessed by pharmaceutical corporations due 
to discretionary government actions—charging prices inflated by 
government-granted patent monopolies and by selling medicines 
developed by government research—are in that category. There-
fore upon seizure, the corporations are not entitled to compensa-
tion for that value. 
3.  The “Nuisance Exception” to Fifth Amendment Takings Law 
Along with Civil and Criminal Forfeiture Laws Exempt the 
Government from Any Obligation to Compensate Pharmaceutical 
Corporations for the Substantial Value Gained from Actions that 
Harm Public Health. 
Much of the suffering and death occurring during the current 
national medicines crisis can be attributed to ill-advised govern-
ment choices. The government grants private entities patent 
awards for government-funded discoveries via the Bayh-Dole Act, 
allows take-it-or-leave-it pricing via the 2003 Medicare program ban 
on negotiating down the price of medicines, and permits corpora-
tions to distort the market by gifting billions of dollars each year to 
prescribing physicians for non-research purposes such as honorar-
ia, luxury goods, and travel.197 These government actions, along 
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with the broad retreat from the wise legacy of not awarding private 
monopolies for essential medicines, have all contributed to the cri-
sis at hand.198 
There is no legal violation when pharmaceutical corporations 
work within existing regulatory structures to take advantage of a 
system rigged in their favor. But the corporations have not been 
content with fully ethical, legal opportunism. Instead, they have 
engaged in a wide range of well-documented, and pervasive prac-
tices that are either outright illegal or systematically abusive, inflict-
ing grievous harm to public health in the process. 
Industry practices such as price-fixing, abuses of the patent pro-
cess, overcharging government programs, and a dizzying array of 
illegal marketing schemes have long been the subject of govern-
ment investigations, criminal charges, and civil suits for misbehav-
ior. There is a reason why the oft-sanctioned industry returns again 
and again to these practices, despite enduring billions of dollars in 
fines and penalties: these practices contribute substantially to the 
value of the companies. Under the nuisance exception to the Fifth 
Amendment’s Takings Clause requirement for compensation, 
none of that value should be recovered by corporations when na-
tionalization occurs. 
It is beyond the scope of this Article to estimate the dollar 
amount of that ill-gotten value, but it is worth noting the breathtak-
ing extent of the pharmaceutical industry’s malfeasance. When the 
advocacy organization Public Citizen surveyed the major financial 
settlements and court judgments between pharmaceutical compa-
nies and federal and state governments from 1991 through 2017, it 
found that drugmakers entered into 412 settlements totaling $38.6 
billion in criminal and civil penalties.199 These penalties included 
sanctions for dozens of major violations of the U.S. False Claims 
Act, the Anti-Kickback Statute, the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, 
and multiple state laws prohibiting Medicaid fraud. 
The most commonly-cited ethical offense involved violating re-
strictions on promoting off-label uses of products, prohibitions 
that exist because those uses have not been analyzed for possibly 
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dangerous effects.200 For example, Pfizer was charged in 2009 with 
illegally promoting off-label uses of the pain medicine Bextra, 
which was later pulled from the market for safety reasons.201 Glax-
oSmithKline was fined $12 billion in response to allegations it ille-
gally promoted its antidepressant Paxil for use in adolescents, and 
Eli Lilly paid $1.4 billion in response to claims it unlawfully pro-
moted its antipsychotic drug Zyprexa—even to the point of train-
ing its sales persons in how to avoid legal requirements.202 Despite 
the large settlements, the Public Citizen report and other advo-
cates say the illegal marketing practices continue to be rampant. 
“Marketing departments of many drug companies don’t respect 
any boundaries of professionalism or the law,” says Jerry Avorn, a 
professor at Harvard Medical School.203 
Multiple lawsuits and government investigations find that manu-
facturers of insulin, a drug that yields $24 billion in annual reve-
nue, have engaged in illegal price-fixing for decades.204 The three 
companies that dominate the global market for insulin—Sanofi, 
Novo Nordisk, and Eli Lilly—have raised the list prices of their 
products multiple times over many years in lock step. Current pric-
es can reach as high as fifty times the estimated manufacturing 
cost.205 “Instead of falling prices, as one might expect after decades 
of competition, three drug makers who make different versions of 
insulin have continuously raised prices on this life-saving medica-
tion,” members of Congress wrote in 2016 when demanding the 
U.S. Department of Justice and Federal Trade Commission launch 
an investigation into price-fixing. 206 
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The industry’s manipulation of the patent process is likely its 
most vigorous and lucrative abuse of the laws and regulatory sys-
tems. The 2018 report by Initiative for Medicines, Access and 
Knowledge (I-MAK) revealed that the twelve top-selling drugs in 
the United States average 125 patent applications per drug, many 
of them frivolous, giving each drug an average of thirty-eight years 
of attempted patent protections—far beyond the baseline twenty-
year patent life.207 Additional patents are often sought for minor 
changes to the original medicine or adjustments to the dosage or 
delivery system, such as transforming multiple doses into a once-a-
day pill or even turning a tablet into a capsule.208 This “patent 
thicketing,” process has been condemned by commentators from 
the USA Today editorial board (“abusive tactics”, “shameless 
gamesmanship”) to U.S. Senators (“manipulating the patent sys-
tem”) to public health advocates (“abuse of the patent system”).209 
Yet it continues. AbbVie, the manufacturer of the world’s top-
selling drug, Humira, has sought a remarkable two hundred and 
forty-seven patents on its use. Humira remains monopoly-protected 
in the United States until 2023, despite the fact that its main in-
gredient has been off-patent for several years.210 In 2015, AbbVie’s 
CEO bragged about the effectiveness of this tactic, “Any company 
seeking to market a biosimilar version of Humira will have to con-
tend with this extensive patent estate, which AbbVie intends to en-
force vigorously.”211 
The massive impact that abuse of the patent process has on 
medicine prices, and thus the value of these corporations, is clear. 
I-MAK’s analysis of the patent thicket-protected twelve best-selling 
drugs in the United States showed that from 2012 to 2018, the 
prices of eleven of these best-sellers rose an average of eighty per-
cent. By one analysis, AbbVie makes nearly $50 million in addi-
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tional revenue per day on Humira due to extended patents.212 Lit-
tle wonder that the corporations are known to deploy “floors full of 
lawyers” to extend patents, overwhelming regulatory agencies and 
any comparatively underfunded opposition to patent thicketing.213 
Economists studying the global intellectual property system have 
concluded that this phenomenon has led to many weak patents 
that go unchallenged.214 
Another way that pharmaceutical companies extend monopolies 
via unethical behavior is through so-called “pay-for-delay” schemes. 
For a would-be generic or biosimilar manufacturer, the patent 
thickets present a significant challenge. Before it can sell its prod-
uct, the generic manufacturer faces costly, years-long, thicket-citing 
lawsuits filed by the deep-pocketed corporation that holds the pa-
tents. Knowing this, the patent-holding pharmaceutical companies 
offer would-be competitors a substantial sum in return for an 
agreement to postpone the entry of a generic drug into the mar-
ket. A recent analysis showed that more than one-third of generic 
medicines approved by the FDA between 2016 and 2018 were not 
yet on the market, often because of thicketing and pay-for-delay.215 
Pay-for-delay has been described as “one of the sleaziest and most 
blatantly self-serving” of all anti-competitive practices.216 It is also 
effective. The Federal Trade Commission estimates that the ex-
tended monopoly price boost from pay-for-delay schemes costs 
U.S. patients an extra $3.5 billion each year.217 
Upon government seizure, none of the value extracted by these 
manipulative practices should be reimbursed to pharmaceutical 
corporations. The Supreme Court has often explained that the just 
compensation guarantee “was designed to bar Government from 
forcing some people alone to bear public burdens which, in all 
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fairness and justice, should be borne by the public as a whole.”218 
But the Court has also long made it clear that the “fairness and jus-
tice” justification for compensation is negated when the govern-
ment seizes property in order to stop the private owner from de-
ploying it in a manner that harms the public welfare. 
This exception to Fifth Amendment takings law is known as the 
“nuisance” or “noxious use” exception. It traces its origins back to 
at least 1887, when the Supreme Court in Mugler v. Kansas rejected 
a challenge by a brewer to Kansas temperance laws that de facto de-
stroyed the brewer’s business. The Mugler Court held that the gov-
ernment is within its police power to conduct a seizure to protect 
public health, safety, or welfare without the requirement of com-
pensation: 
The power which the states have of prohibiting such use by 
individuals of their property, as will be prejudicial to the 
health, the morals, or the safety of the public, is not—and, 
consistently with the existence and safety of organized soci-
ety, cannot be—burdened with the condition that the state 
must compensate such individual owners for pecuniary 
losses they may sustain, by reason of their not being permit-
ted, by a noxious use of their property, to inflict injury up-
on the community.219 
Importantly, the noxious use exception does not require a find-
ing that the harmful acts were illegal prior to seizure. For example, 
the noxious use exception was applied when value was lost in 
Mugler (formerly legal liquor sales), Goldblatt v. Town of Hempstead 
(once-permissible gravel and sand mining zoned out by ordi-
nance), Miller v. Schoene (diseased trees removed), and Hadacheck v. 
Sebastian (brick yard zoned out by ordinance).220 There is an argu-
ment to be made that a certain level of patent thicketing and even 
pay-for-delay schemes by pharmaceutical corporations are not vio-
lations of current law.221 But there is no argument that these prac-
tices are not, in the words of the Mugler Court, “prejudicial to the 
health, the morals, or the safety of the public,” and therefore com-
panies engaged in these practices  are not required to be compen-
sated for the fruits of their misdeeds. 
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Throughout the 20th century, the nuisance/noxious use excep-
tion continued to be recognized, including in Justice Brandeis’ dis-
sent in the landmark 1922 decision Pennsylvania Coal v. Mahon, and 
six years later in Miller v. Schoene.222 In Miller, the Court cited Mugler 
in refusing to allow compensation for the state of Virginia’s de-
struction of infected red cedar trees on Miller’s property, ruling 
that protecting the broader public at the expense of a property 
owner’s interests was a core principle of legislative police powers. 
As noted above, the Mahon decision was the first to hold that a 
governmental regulation can burden the use of private property 
such that the regulation rises to the level of a taking that requires 
compensation under the Fifth Amendment. But in 1987, the Court 
in Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass’n v. DeBenedictis reaffirmed that the 
requirement to compensate is removed when the regulation ad-
vances a legitimate state interest, such as the interest in stopping a 
threat to the common welfare.223 “Courts have consistently held 
that a State need not provide compensation when it diminishes or 
destroys the value of property by stopping illegal activity or abating 
a public nuisance.”224 In 1992, the Court in Lucas v. South Carolina 
Coastal Council again recognized the “long line of this Court’s cas-
es” affirming the nuisance exception to the general rule requiring 
compensation.225 The Lucas facts involved a regulatory taking, not a 
full seizure of property, but the Court’s reasoning and subsequent 
lower federal court decisions point in the direction of the nuisance 
exception applying to physical takings as well as regulatory  
takings.226 
The nuisance exception coexists alongside multiple state and 
federal statutes enabling forfeiture of private property connected 
to illegal activity, as long as those forfeitures do not violate the “ex-
cessive fines” clause of the Eighth Amendment.227 As one report 
put it after the drug company GlaxoSmithKline was fined $2.8 bil-
lion for its illegal marketing, the company had become a “sophisti-
cated criminal enterprise.”228 Of course, the U.S. government has 
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no obligation upon seizure of a criminal enterprise’s assets to re-
imburse them for the value they extracted from illegal acts. Crimi-
nal convictions are not a prerequisite for forfeiture, just a showing 
that the seized property was involved in criminal activity. In fact, in 
a recent ten-year period, the U.S. Drug Enforcement Administra-
tion took at least $3.2 billion in cash from people who were never 
charged with a crime.229 This civil forfeiture right to taking with-
out compensation exists alongside the TRIPS Agreement-
protected right to issue compulsory licensing with low or zero 
remuneration when necessary to remedy anti-competitive prac-
tices.230 
In sum, the law provides both tools and justifications for the 
government to seize some pharmaceutical corporation assets and 
refuse to compensate on the grounds that the assets were used to 
further a public nuisance or criminal activity. In this context, the 
boundaries of the uncompensated seizures will be equal to a cal-
culation of the value obtained by the corporations’ actions that 
furthered a public nuisance. It is beyond the scope of this Article 
to estimate that precise amount. However, given the sordid rec-
ord of marketing fraud and patent abuse outlined above, the to-
tal will be substantial. It is worth again quoting constitutional 
scholar and property rights advocate Roger Pilon of the Cato Insti-
tute, this time for his explanation for why the Fifth Amendment 
does not require compensation for value obtained by noxious or 
illegal acts. “When government acts, under its police power, to se-
cure rights—when it stops someone from polluting, for example, 
or from excessively endangering others—the restricted owner is 
not entitled to compensation, whatever his financial losses, because 
the uses prohibited or “taken” were wrong to begin with. . . . 
[H]ere again the question is not whether value was taken but 
whether a right was taken. Proper uses of the police power take no 
rights. They protect rights.”231 
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D.  Step Four: The USMA Seizes and Compensates Private Industry for the 
Remaining Assets that Trigger the Just Compensation Requirement 
As was the case with the Tennessee Valley Authority Act of 1933 
and the Aviation and Transportation Security Act of 2001, if the 
U.S. government executed Steps One through Three outlined in 
this Article, it would inflict grievous damage on privately held cor-
porations. That is a result that the United States has neither the 
moral nor the legal obligation to regret. 
As the Supreme Court held in the challenge to the TVA by the 
private businesses it displaced, the harm experienced by pharma-
ceutical corporations is “damnum absque injuria—a damage not 
consequent upon the violation of any right recognized by law.”232 
As the Court later ruled in United States v. Willow River Power Co., 
where the federal government raising of a river’s water level 
harmed the efficiency of the plaintiff’s hydroelectric plant, loss of 
economic value alone did not lead to a constitutional obligation to 
compensate. “[The Fifth Amendment] does not undertake, how-
ever, to socialize all losses, but those only which result from a tak-
ing of property.”233 Similar decisions upholding the government’s 
right to take actions even when they are injurious to private inter-
ests were issued by the Court in Block v. Hirsch (District of Colum-
bia rent control is a legitimate use of state power, despite financial 
loss to landlords) and Home Building and Loan v. Blaisdell (wide-
spread economic emergency justified Minnesota’s suspension of 
home creditors’ foreclosure rights).234 
The TVA sequence provides the blueprint for the final stage of 
the nationalization of the pharmaceutical industry. After losing 
their legal challenge to the government’s action creating the TVA, 
the Tennessee Electric Power Company sold its electric system to 
the TVA and shut down its energy business. 
Here, the U.S. pharmaceutical industry will be forced to choose 
the same option. Its business model will be undercut by widespread 
compulsory licensing in the United States, its most important mar-
ket. Compensation will be denied for both the value of withdrawn 
government support and the value gained by the industry’s nui-
sance behavior. The remaining value of the pharmaceutical corpo-
rations will resemble that of an oil field run dry: the land and 
equipment have some residual worth, but it is a fraction of the val-
ue the land had when the oil flowed. 
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In the process outlined here, the federal government will exer-
cise its rights to shut off the flow of taxpayer-provided riches to the 
pharmaceutical industry. Once it does so, compensation for the 
remaining value, including manufacturing plants and distribution 
infrastructure, will come at a reasonable price. That transaction 
will finally conclude the tragic era of medicines profiteering and 
launch a new system that restores life-saving medications to their 
rightful place as affordable, accessible public goods.
CONCLUSION
Millions of Americans are in pain, at risk of emergency hospital-
ization, and even dying. They suffer because they cannot afford 
medicines that are inexpensive to manufacture and were discov-
ered by government-funded research. Those medicines are held in 
monopolies by private, for-profit corporations that set prices at lev-
els ensuring both record profit margins and a society-wide crisis in 
accessing essential treatment.
U.S. history and law have cleared the path towards ending this 
crisis. Medicines are a public good, and U.S. constitutional law jus-
tifies full seizure of all assets of the pharmaceutical industry. More-
over, the compensation for that seizure will be substantially re-
duced because of the industry’s reliance on government funding 
and licensing and its widespread malfeasance that harms the pub-
lic welfare.
Since the country’s birth, the U.S. people, acting through their 
government, have shown time and again a willingness to elevate 
the needs of the community over the interests of private property. 
It is time to make that choice again. It is time for the United States 
to nationalize its pharmaceutical industry.

